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DEDICATION
Bob Cover often talked about what is inherent in the role of judge and
about the relationship between judges and sovereigns. In addition to giv-
ing us his insights and his wisdom, Bob invariably enriched our views by
offering us texts with which we had not been familiar. In that tradition,
we provide the following essay on the images of justice-for Bob Cover.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bob wrote the following:
The principal icon of justice suggests a myth and the myth may
provide a clue to the ambiguities of procedural postures. Justi-
tia-sword and scales with blindfolded eyes. There is a critical am-
biguity to the blindfold of Justice-which no end of explanation in
terms of "impartiality" can illuminate. Surely, Justitia is blindfolded
so that she may be impartial, but just as surely her blindfold cannot
function on that level alone. Any icon carries with it the ambiguity
of the concrete. As the lack of sight renders favoritism impossible, it
opens up the manifold potential expressed in the Biblical story of
Isaac's blessing.
Consider, a moment, a possible myth that might lie behind our
well-known icon. Each God's hand is set against her neighbor. The
t Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center.
-i-- Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. Our thanks to the Univer-
sity of Southern California Law Center for support for this project, to Jennifer Montagu and Eliza-
beth McGrath of the Warburg Institute of the University of London for their hospitality and much-
needed help, to Jutta Brandt, Claude Klein, and Dorothy Resnik for assistance in translations, to the
ever-energetic, able, and patient USC law library staff, and to many of our colleagues, especially Ron
Garet, Barbara Herman, Mickey Morgan, Kelyn Roberts, Avi Soifer, Ruth Weisberg, and Steve
Wizner, who have discussed this essay with us. Research for this essay was supported by the Univer-
sity of Southern California Law Center.
1727
The Yale Law Journal
Gods, amidst heated disputes leading to a cosmogenic crisis, search
for the route to peace and with it the end of the cosmic travail. The
obvious solution, an impartial arbiter to the various differences, is
proposed but is dashed on the rocks of personalities as each and
every applicant for the job is put to a test. One young, strong God
comes forward and seems fearless and undaunted before threats but
is seduced from his vocation by a beautiful nymph. An old and wise
man is impervious to chicanery and immune to the allures of sex,
but quivers before the fist of the strong. The tests go on until Justitia
steps forward. Self-consciously, she ties her scarf to her eyes and
with that effort of will she sees not. Seeing not, she fears not. No
form attracts her. Her very invention of the gesture has a superficial
attractiveness about it. She is obviously attuned to the need to keep
much from herself and the very fact that she is cognizant of the im-
port of keeping out information makes her a more suitable candidate
than one who rashly or stupidly tries to overcome.
Justitia is chosen as their judge and her story portrays the "para-
digmatic gesture" repeated by all judges who are worthy of the
name. It is a tale of purposeful interposition of a makeshift screen
between reality and decision, an interposition which obstructs direct
knowledge.
The richness of the concreteness of our icon lies in its incapacity to
be reduced "merely" to an idea like impartiality. Justitia in our tale
has put on the blindfold to avoid the pitfalls of fear or favor; she has
rendered it necessary to produce by indirection. If she has removed
the possibility of even the subtleties of unconscious favor, she has
also removed the possibility of less than conscious insight.
Our icon, however, is Justitia blindfolded, not Justitia blind, and
therein is suggested a critical dimension for procedure. Political car-
toonists have often seized upon this dimension of the icon and por-
trayed Justitia "peeking" in order to illustrate the willful failure of
impartiality. The blindfold (as opposed to blindness) suggests an act
of self-restraint. She could act otherwise and there is, thus, an ever-
present element of choice in assuming the posture. The temptation to
raise the blindfold may not be the temptation to cheat. Indeed, the
strongest temptation for persons of quality is the temptation to
see-to overcome the elusiveness of indirection.
Procedure is the blindfold of Justice.'
In creating this myth, Bob relied upon familiar imagery of justice to tell
a story rich in meaning about the relationship between knowledge and
fair judgment and about the role of constraints in enabling acceptable
1. R. CovER, 0. Fiss & J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE ch. 5 (Foundation Press, forthcoming). When
we discussed this essay with Diane Cover, she told us that Bob's interest in the iconography of justice
was sparked by the Talmudic phrase: r=%trrzp_,j V "Mn' (roughly, "The signature of God
is truth"). THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tractate Shabbat 55A.
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judgment. Bob drew, for this "folktale of justice,"2 upon an iconographic
history replete with images of Justitia, of judges, and of the act of render-
ing judgment. In this essay, we provide a brief overview of the imagery
associated-over centuries and across national boundaries-with justice.3
For us, the endurance of Justice as a recognizable image, the consistent
use of the imagery of Justice by sovereigns, and the relationship of this
imagery to the problems of exercising judicial power all have an intrigu-
ing history and substantial didactic power.
The image of Justice herself is one of remarkable longevity. For more
than 2000 years, people have looked at images of Justice, drawn meanings
from them, and written about them. More than simply an artifact of
Western culture, Justice stands as a quasi-religious, quasi-political icon.
Of course, Justice is not a solitary icon in the Western tradition.
Rather, she is one of a series of images, most in the female form,4 associ-
ated with powerful concepts of virtues and vices. Justice, like many of
these images, traces her ancestry to goddesses. Her forerunners seem to
have been Ma'at in Egyptian culture,5 Themis and Dike in ancient
Greece,' and then Justitia under Roman rule.' When goddesses lost cur-
rency as the Church grew in power, Justice appeared in Christian im-
agery-used not as a goddess but as a personification of the ancient vir-
2. Much of Bob's work relied upon folktales and myths of justice as vehicles for understanding the
roles of judges, the function of justice, and the meaning of law. See, e.g., Cover, Violence and the
Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) [hereinafter Violence and the Word]; Cover, The Folktales ofJus-
tice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.L. REV. 179 (1985) [hereinafter Folktales of Justice]; Cover,
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983)
[hereinafter Nomos and Narrative].
3. We do not consider here the work of caricaturists, such as Daumier and Spy, who portrayed
lawyers, judges, and other court functionaries.
4. See generally M. WARNER, MONUMENTS AND MAIDENS: THE ALLEGORY OF THE FEMALE
FORM 63-87 (1985) (chapter on "Engendered Images"); S. Pfeiffenberger, The Iconology of Giotto's
Virtues and Vices at Padua ch. 4 (1966) (Ph.D. dissertation, Bryn Mawr College) (available at Uni-
versity Microfilms No. 67-3811). On the attitude of medieval society toward women, see Kraus, Eve
and Mary: Conflicting Images in Medieval Woman, in FEMINISM AND ART HISTORY 77-99 (N.
Broude & M. Garrard eds. 1982).
5. See W. FORMAN & H. KISCHKEwrrz, DIE ALTXGYPTISCHE ZEICHNUNG ("Ancient Egyptian
Drawing") plates 48, 51 (1971); 0. KISSEL, DIE JUSTITIA: REFLEXIONEN OBER EIN SYMBOL UND
SEINE DARSTELLUNG IN DER BILDENDEN KUNST ("Justitia: Reflections on a Symbol and Its Repre-
sentation in Sculpture") 19-22 (1984).
6. See J. HARRISON, THESIS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF GREEK RELIGION 198, 480
(1927); J. JONES, THE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY OF THE GREEKS (1956); H. LLOYD-JONES, THE
JUSTICE OF ZEUS 50 (1971); H. NORTH, FROM MYTH TO ICON: REFLECTIONS OF GREEK ETHICAL
DOCTRINE IN LITERATURE AND ART (1979). According to Professor North, among the Virtues, only
Dikaiosyne (Justice) had a recognizable "type" in ancient art. North cites Aulus Gellius as emphasiz-
ing Justice's "stern appearance and keen gaze." H. NORTH, supra, at 178 n.3. Michael Evans states
that Aulus Gellius provided the Middle Ages with the only information about how Justice was por-
trayed in antiquity. Evans, Two Sources for Maimed Justice, 11 NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF ART
12, 12 (1982).
7. 0. KISSEL, supra note 5, at 23-26; Lichocka, Justitia sur les Monnaies Imperiales Romaines,
15 TRAVAUX DU CENTRE D'ARCHLOLOGIE MEDITERRANEENNE DE L'ACADFI2vIE POLONAISE DES
SCIENCES 11-123 (1974).
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tue.8 In medieval traditions, Justice achieves a place as one of the four
cardinal virtues; the others are Prudence, Temperance, and Fortitude.'
Joined by the three theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity,"0 the
cardinal virtues battled with the seven vices in various depictions of the
contest between good and evil.1" During the Renaissance, Justice images
abounded. Justice continued to appear with frequency during the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, when allegorical subject matter was still
in favor. 2 But she is not only a relic of the past. Justice stands atop Old
8. See A. KATZENELLENBOGEN, ALLEGORIES OF THE VIRTUES AND VICES IN MEDIAEVAL ART
28 (1939) (Justice appears in Christian art as early as fifth century in dome fresco in El Bagawat);
see also S. EDGERTON, PICTURES AND PUNISHMENT: ART AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION DURING
THE FLORENTINE RENAISSANCE 23, 38, 52 n.38 (1985); M. EVANS, MEDIEVAL DRAWINGS plates
34-35 (1969) (images of Virtues linked to biblical scenes); R. TUVE, ALLEGORICAL IMAGERY: SOME
MEDIAEVAL BOOKS AND THEIR POSTERITY 66 (1966). Tuve believes that the integration of the
classical with the Christian virtues was "effortless." R. TUVE, supra, at 76. See generally J. Shaw,
Images of Justice in Mediaeval Art (1980) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
9. According to S. Pfeiffenberger, supra note 4, the cardinal virtues (Prudence, Temperance, For-
titude, and Justice) are linked to the Platonic characteristics of wisdom, temperance, courage, and
justice, taken by Aristotle to be moral virtues. Pfeiffenberger traces the references from Aristotle to
Cicero to St. Ambrose, who "was the first to term the 'Moral Virtues' 'Cardinal.'" Id. ch. 4, pt. 1, at
2-3. See generally H. NORTH, supra note 6 (study of theme of Temperance); id. at 229-38 (discuss-
ing regional variation in iconography of virtues and occasional blurring or sharing of attributes).
10. See I Corinthians 13:13 (letter from St. Paul); S. Pfeiffenberger, supra note 4, ch. 4, pt. 1, at
2.
11. Early Christian writers created lists of sins or vices. Over time, ideas of virtues in opposition
to corresponding vices developed, although different vices and virtues were paired (in the various
texts) in battles between good and evil. See S. Pfeiffenberger, supra note 4, ch. 4, pt. 1, at 6-11. The
vices (or sins) have varying translations, often including Despair, Envy, Infidelity, Injustice, Greed,
Inconstancy, and Gluttony. Id. ch. 4, pt. 1, at 13-15; see M. BLOOMFIELD, THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS
ch. 12 (1952). A contemporary list includes Lust, Pride, Anger, Avarice, Envy, Sloth, and Gluttony.
A. POWELL, THE KINDLY ONES 97-98 (Berkley Medallion ed. 1965); see also E. PANOFSKY, STUD-
IES IN ICONOLOGY: HUMANISTIC THEMES IN THE ART OF THE RENAISSANCE 224 (1962) (Gluttony,
Lechery, Avarice, Luxury, Wrath, Envy, and Sloth). For an analysis of one depiction of the vices, see
Shapiro, The Virtues and Vices in Ambrogio Lorenzetti's Franciscan Martyrdom, 46 ART BULL. 367
(1964).
Three important sources for depictions of virtues and vices are the psychomachiae, the writings of
St. Thomas Aquinas, and the Sommes le Roi. Prudentius' influential psychomachia, or "battle of the
soul," was written "as early as the fifth century." A. KATZFNELLENBOGEN, supra note 8, at 4. The
combatants are personified in many psychomachia manuscripts. St. Thomas Aquinas, writing in the
thirteenth century, interpreted Aristotelian virtues in the context of Christian theology and contrasted
virtues and vices. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Dominican fathers trans. 1947) 819-989
(Treatise on Habits); id. at 1169-1385 (Treatise on Faith, Hope, and Charity). See generally Pfeif-
fenberger, supra note 4, ch. 4, pt. 1, at 16-20. Around the same time, Sommes le Roi (vernacular
compendiums of the "elements of the Christian faith with special emphasis on the virtues and vices")
appeared and provided variations on the iconographical portrayals for the virtues and vices. See E.
Kosmer, A Study of the Style and Iconography of a Thirteenth-Century Somme le Roi, Introduction
at 1-4 (1973) (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (available at University Microfilms No. 74-11).
See generally A. KATZENELLENBOGEN, supra note 8, at 31-36; Tuve, Notes on the Virtues and Vices
(pts. 1 & 2), 26 J. WARBURG & COURTAULD INSTS. 264 (1963), 27 J. WARBURG & COURTAULD
INSTs. 42 (1964) [hereinafter Tuve, Notes Part One or Part Two]. Over time, authors and artists
varied the numbers, translations, and oppositons of virtues and vices. The role of these depictions as
mnemonic devices is explored in F. YATES, THE ART OF MEMORY (1966); Roberts & Weisberg,
Medieval Drawing and the Arts of Memory, 10 CORANTO 28 (1975).
12. H. NORTH, supra note 6, at 260.
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Bailey in London"3 and the City Hall in New York. See Figure 1. Early
in this century, Gustav Klimt executed a highly unconventional and con-
troversial version of her for a university mural in Vienna. 4 Although not
ubiquitous in the United States today, Justice can be found in courtrooms
around the country.15
Justice's longevity prompts our second area of inquiry. Most of the
other monumental images of virtues, vices, and comparable concepts have
long been out of fashion. Few of us can even recognize the many images
catalogued in Renaissance iconography"8 and in the European emblem
books popular from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries11 A
woman looking into a mirror does not speak to all of us as Prudence. 18 A
woman with a lion skin or a broken column does not call Fortitude to the
contemporary mind,19 nor is a woman carrying a bridle and a pitcher
understood in this society as Temperance.20 Yet show us a hulking wo-
man with scales, blindfold, and sword, and the association is immediate:
Justice. See Figure 2.
Why can so many of us so easily recognize Justice? Because, over the
centuries, members of diverse societies have been taught repeatedly to
13. Photographic Archives of the Warburg Institute (copies of excerpts on file with authors).
14. Jurisprudence was one of a series of paintings about medicine, law, and philosophy that
Klimt executed during 1903-07 for the University of Vienna's Great Hall. The paintings attracted
public criticism and were not hung at the University. Klimt repurchased the commission. Subse-
quently, the paintings ended up in private collections; the three eventually were destroyed in the last
days of World War II. K. VARNEDOE, VIENNA, 1900: ART, ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN 153, 232
(1986); C. SCHORSKE, FIN-DE-SI'CLE VIENNA 248-49 (1980) (figures 47, 48); see infra text accom-
panying note 91. The photograph of Jurisprudence was provided to the authors for research purposes
by Galerie Welz in Salzburg.
15. See, e.g., COURT HOUSE: A PHOTOGRAPHIC DOCUMENT plate 69 (R. Pare ed. 1978) [herein-
after COURT HOUSE] (Pitkin County Court House, Aspen, Colorado (1890-91)); id. plate 133 (Mon-
terey County Court House, Monterey, California (1937-38)); id. plate 235 (Merced County Court
House, Merced, California (1874-75)); id. plate 243 (Belmont County Court House, Saint Clair-
sville, Ohio (1885-88)); id. plate 264 (Stained Glass Window, Courtroom in La Porte Court House,
Indiana (1892-94)).
16. Consider, for example, the virtues depicted in C. RIPA, BAROQUE AND Rococo PICTORIAL
IMAGERY (E. Maser ed. 1971) [hereinafter C. RiPA (Maser ed.)]. The first edition of Ripa was
published in Rome in 1593. Id. at ix.
17. See H. NORTH, supra note 6, at 250. An example of such books is Andreas Alciatus' treatise,
first published in 1531. 1 A. ALCIATUS, THE LATIN EMBLEMS (P. Daly trans. 1985); 2 A. AL-
CIATUS, EMBLEMS IN TRANSLATION (P. Daly trans. 1985).
18. See C. RIPA (Maser ed.), supra note 16, at 179 (Prudence "looks into a mirror which she
holds in one hand."); see also Figure 2 (Justice and Prudence).
19. For the lion's skin, see S. Pfeiffenberger, supra note 4, ch. 2, pt. 2, at 21 (description by
Giotto). For the broken column, see H. NORTH, supra note 6, at 85, plate 3 (Francesco Pesellino's
Fortitude and Temperance, ca. 1460).
20. C. RIPA (Maser ed.), supra note 16, at 149 ("The personification of Temperance is a woman
. . . who holds a bridle. . . . As a bridle restrains a horse, so does temperance hold appetites in
cheek."); see also H. NORTH, supra note 6, at 201-02 (discussing pitcher and iconography of Tem-
perance generally). The associations between object and concept were not always constant across time
and region. See, e.g., Albrecht Diirer's Fortuna (with bridle), reproduced in THE COMPLETE EN-
GRAVINGS, ETCHINGS AND DRYPOINTS OF ALBRECHT DORER 76, plate 37 (W. Strauss ed. 1972)
[hereinafter DORER].
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Figure 1. Justice on top of the City Hall, New York. The building,
designed by Mangin and McComb, was built between 1803 and 1812.
Reproduced with permission of Mathew Bender & Company, inc.
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Figure 2. Unknown, from the sixteenth century (see 9 A. BARTSCH, LE
PEINTRE GRAVEUR 45 (Cor'Met, B.2) (ed. 1970, reprint of 1920-1922
Wiirzburg ed., reset of edition Leipzig, 1854-1870). Reproduced by the
permission of the Warburg Institute of the University of London,
England.
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recognize this image. The lesson inherent in the image has advanced the
interests of political configurations. While rulers throughout the ages have
sought to associate themselves with all the virtues,"* sovereigns have evi-
denced a special interest in aligning with and appropriating unto them-
selves the particular virtue of Justice. See Figure 3. In this essay, we pro-
vide examples of such deployments of the image of Justice, as sovereigns
have attempted to assert that they acted in her name or in accordance with
her divine guidance.
All sovereigns claim (notwithstanding evidence to the contrary) that
their violence goes forth in the name of Justice.22 While the other cardinal
and theological virtues-Temperance, Prudence, Fortitude, Faith, Hope,
and Charity-would be desirable attributes of any polity, none is essential
to the state in its functions as lawmaker and law enforcer. During ages in
which faith in a god's judgment was pervasive, the state linked its judging
to that of the divine. In ages historians have described as those "of reason"
or "enlightenment," states still attempted to claim that their rule was
something other than that of limited mortals, that the government was one
"of laws, and not of men."'23 Appropriately nervous about the implications
of the judgments rendered by all-too-mortal judges, states have attempted
to disassociate their justice from human fallibility-especially because, in
the name of that justice, governments have applied force, restricted liberty,
and even executed their citizens.
An analysis of the history of the uses of justice imagery is made more
complex by the fact that, while the image of Justice has enduring quali-
ties, some of the attributes of Justice have changed over time. Although
the images and attributes currently associated with Justice are those of an
imposing woman with sword, scales, and. blindfold, other, less appealing
images and attributes of Justice and of judgment have been deployed in
the past. For example, during the sixteenth century, a town hall in Ge-
neva was adorned with a picture of judges with their hands severed. 2 '
Other pictures, of handless Justices and of the gruesome punishments vis-
ited upon corrupt judges, appeared elsewhere. 5 See Figures 4, 5a, and 5b.
21. H. NORTH, supra note 6, at 223-34.
22. See, e.g., E. ROPER & C. LEISER, SKELETONS OF JUSTICE (1941) (descriptions of courts in
Nazi Germany).
23. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
24. Deonna, Les Fresques de la Maison de Ville de Gen~ve, 13 REVUE SUISSE D'ART ET
D'ARcHgOLOGIE 129 (1952); see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
25. Mundy, A Preparatory Sketch for Gerard David's "Justice of Cambyses" Panels in Bruges,
122 BURLINGTON MAG. 122 (1980) (flaying of corrupt judge Sisamnes painted by Gerard David for
Town Hall of Bruges); see infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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Figure 3. Verrio, Queen Anne as Justice, from the Hampton Court Pal-
ace, painted between 1702 and 1704. Reproduced with permission of
the Royal Commission on the Historical Monuments of England.
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Figure 4. Detail from Les Juges aux Mains Coup'es from the Town Hall
of Geneva, Switzerland from the late fifteenth century. Reproduced
with permission of the Mus~e d'Art et d'Histoire of Geneva.
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Figure 5a. Gerard David, The Judgment of Cambyses, Panel 1 (the seiz-
ing of judge Sisamnes) (1498). Reproduced with permission of the
Groeninge Museum, Bruges, Belgium.
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Figure 5b. Gerard David, The Judgment of Cambyses, Panel 2 (the flay-
ing of Judge Sisamnes) (1498). Reproduced with permission of the
Groeninge Museum, Bruges, Belgium.
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Why were there such displays of "maimed" judges and Justice?2" To
remind the polity of the possibility of corrupt judging? To warn judges of
the penalty rulers might exact if judges acted in a manner that displeased?
To evoke the notion that human judges can err? Whatever the derivation
of and intent behind the commission or execution of these images, the
decorators of contemporary civic buildings no longer find such images ap-
propriate. A more serene Justice appears today, instead of what are (to
us) powerfully disquieting and aggressive images.
Even the calmer images presented today retain some ambiguity, which
leads us to our third inquiry. What is the relationship between justice
imagery and the act of judging? As Bob Cover's myth demonstrates, the
blindfold (a relatively recent and far from ubiquitous attribute of Justice)
is particularly intriguing in this regard. See Figure 6. Does the blindfold
represent impartiality? Freedom from the corruption of the senses? An
assumption that insight and wisdom come from within? Can the blindfold
sustain the mythic qualities with which Bob invested it, or is the blindfold
more readily seen as a criticism of Justice, easily corrupted or lead astray
because she is unable to see? Can we ascribe to the sightless Justice the
rectitude of one who receives information only through the filter of the
law, or shall we distrust her as one who cannot take into account human
experience? These tensions are inherent, even in the relatively placid de-
pictions of Justice in the current era. The images mirror the problems
that the law has in determining what knowledge is permitted and what is
forbidden to those who judge.
Finally, in the ambiguities of the image, we see reflected the uncertain
position that judges inevitably hold. As employees of their sovereigns,
judges are always, at some level, beholden to their sovereigns. But, as
Bob's folktales remind us, to judge is to "speak[] truth to power," 27 to seek
to hold and, on occasion, to exercise some form of jurisdiction beyond that
given by or belonging to the sovereign, so as to have a measure of critical
independence from the sovereign. 28 Although governments attempt to use
judges and justice imagery to legitimate sovereign acts, we look also to the
imagery for reminders of that critical distance between judge and sover-
eign. Perhaps the images-despite rulers' ambitions to the contrary-do
not always equate judge with sovereign.
One caveat is in order. Although we do speculate, we cannot specify the
many meanings of justice imagery for those who commissioned, made, or
saw the images-and, of course, for all of us who now consider them. As
Rudolf Wittkower put it:
26. See Evans, supra note 6, at 12; see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
27. Folktales of Justice, supra note 2, at 190.
28. Id.
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Figure 6. Albrecht Direr, woodcut illustrating Sebastian Brant's Ship of
Fools (1494). Reproduced with permission of the Beinecke Rare Book
Collection of Yale University.
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Is the 16th-century personification of Justice above the entrance to
the Town Hall or in the Magistrate's Court an allegory befitting the
character of the place, a simile of the activity there performed, a
moral and edifying lesson to judge and jury, a quasi-magical symbol
revealing the mysterious quality of the abstract concept "Justice"? or
is it line, form and colour to enliven a bleak wall? . .. [I]t may be
found that our personification of Justice served all these purposes.2"
In addition, recovery of all the depictions of a particular subject is impos-
sible, as is knowledge of even a fraction of the current deployments of any
given image. The political and aesthetic context in which an image func-
tioned is similarly difficult to ascertain, especially given our interest in
crossing from country to country and century to century. Finally, we, like
others, "are not making any attempt so foolhardy as to outline the devel-
opment of the idea of Justice.""0 With these limits in mind, we offer our
speculations on the imagery of justice.
II. THE POLITICAL DEPLOYMENT OF JUSTICE
For much of the Western world's history, Justice has been depicted as a
large female figure, sometimes draped, sometimes naked, holding or sur-
rounded by a series of props identified as her attributes.3 1 Commonly, she
carries a scale3 2 and/or a sword. 3  Occasionally, Justice has a cornuco-
29. R. WITTKOWER, ALLEGORY AND THE MIGRATION OF SYMBOLS 186-87 (1977). Many of
the images of history have been lost to us. Wooden, woven, ceramic, and painted figures, if not dis-
carded, have now been eroded by time. Gold and silver objects have been melted down for coin.
30. R. TUVE, supra note 8, at 68.
31. Our sources are primarily European, British, and North American. Many of the references to
imagery in this essay come from the Photographic Archives of the Warburg Institute in London.
(photocopies of excerpts on file with authors). When possible, we provide references to reproductions
in published materials. The most comprehensive collection of images of Justice of which we are aware
is found in 0. KISSEL, supra note 5.
32. The scales seem to have been used as a symbol of a decisionmaking device since earliest times.
In the Egyptian "Book of the Dead" (ca. 1400 B.C.), the soul of a dead person is shown being
weighed in a balance. One pan holds a heart-shaped vase symbolizing all of the actions of the dead
person; the other pan contains a feather, symbolizing Right and Truth. The Old Testament refers to
scales: "Let me be weighed in an even balance, that God may know mine integrity."Job 31:6. Weigh-
ing as a symbol of Divine Judgment is also found in the Koran. Daube, The Scales of Justice, 63
JURID. REV. 109, 116-17 (1951). In the Iliad, the gods weigh to foretell the results of human events:
"Then Jove his golden scales weighed up, and took the last accounts of Fate for Hector.... Ho-
MER, THE ILIAD ch. xxii, (R. Fitzgerald trans. 1974). In early Christian representations, the "weigh-
ing of the soul" occurs in numerous Last Judgment scenes, often with Saint Michael holding the
scales. For these and many other examples, see Perry, On the Psychostasis in Christian Art (pts. 1 &
2), 22 BURLINGTON MAG. 94, 208 (1912-1913); Daube, supra; see also Raphael'sJustice from 1508,
in the Vatican's Stanza della Segnatura, Rome, reproduced in 0. KISSEL, supra note 5, at 37, plate
24; A. KATZENELLENBOGEN, supra note 8, at 55 (balance as symbol of Justice "from very early
times").
33. See M. WARNER, supra note 4, at 146-76. Other examples include Peter Paul Ruben'sJus-
tice from the seventeenth century, in a private collection in London (photograph on file with authors),
and a painting prepared in 1744 by Joshua Reynolds for a stained glass window in New College,
Oxford, reproduced and discussed in REYNOLDS plate 120 at 147, 290-91 (N. Penny ed. 1986); see
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pia3 4 or fasces (a bundle of rods). 5 Sometimes Justice stares evenly at us,
at other times her eyes are in shadows,36 and in some depictions, she is
blindfolded 3 7-although sometimes the blindfold has open spaces through
which her eyes appear. 8 Upon occasion, an ostrich stands next to Jus-
tice;39 in a few instances, a crane is present."0
The image of a large imposing woman, draped in Grecian robes, blind-
folded, and holding scales and sword is still commonplace in Western Eu-
also Figures 1,2,3,6 & 7.
34. See J. Shaw, supra note 8, at 8. The cornucopia imagery may come from a Herculean myth.
Hercules fought the river-god Achelous, who in the course of battle changed himself into a bull.
Hercules prevailed and broke off one of the bull's horns, which he presented to the beautiful Deia-
nira, over whom the fight had taken place. The bull's horn was the first horn of plenty, which has
since become a symbol of fertility. OVID, METAMORPHOSES 9:1 (B. More trans. 1978).
35. See Battista de Lutero, Dossi, Justice with Fasces and Scales (1544), Dresden, reproduced in
0. KISSEL, supra note 5, at 13, plate 4. In this image, as in others, an axe blade protrudes from the
rods. The fasces were emblematic of the authority of Roman magistrates, and subsequently, of govern-
ment in general. See Valesio, The Beautiful Lie: Heroic Individuality and Fascism, in RECON-
STRUCTING INDIVIDUALISM: AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALITY, AND THE SELF IN WESTERN THOUGHT
163 (T. Heller, M. Sosna & D. Wellberg eds. 1986).
36. Compare S. Pfeiffenberger, supra note 4, ch. 2, pt. 2, at 13-14 (Justice looking at Temper-
ance) with Joshua Reynolds, supra note 33 (Justice's eyes shadowed by her upraised arm).
37. See infra notes 114-42 and accompanying text; e.g., Virgil Solis, Justitia (ca. 1550), Photo-
graphic Archives of the Warburg Institute, London, reproduced in 0. KISSEL, supra note 5, at 66,
plate 52; see also Mathias Gehrung, The Allegory ofJustice Asleep (1543), reproduced in 0. KISSEL,
supra note 5, at 59, plate 45.
38. Justice is depicted with a diaphanous blindfold in several of the designs for stained glass
windows in Northern Europe, in the collection of the Victoria and Albert Museum in London [here-
inafter V & A]. See C. KAUFFMANN, SWISS STAINED GLASS DESIGNS OF THE REFORMATION (exhi-
bition catalogue 1986) (V & A photographs, Nos. 60108, 65099, 65872) (on file with authors); 3 W.
STRAUSS, THE GERMAN SINGLE-LEAF WOODCUT 1550-1600, at 1381 (1975) (Christoph Murer,
Justice); see also Jost Amman,Justitia, Sitting Atop the World (ca. 1564), reproduced in 0. KISSEL,
supra note 5, at 45, plate 31; Hans von Steenwinkel,Justitia (ca. 1576), stained glass in town hall of
Emden, West Germany, reproduced in 0. KISSEL, supra note 5, at 111, plate 89. All of the see-
through blindfolds of which we are aware come from Northern Europe.
39. See, e.g., Luca Giordano,Justice (1681), Palazzo Riccardi, Florence, Italy (available at Photo-
graphic Archives of the Warburg Institute, London (copy on file with authors)); Prints after Raphael,
Justice, Stanze di Rafaello (Sala di Costantino, 1517-1524), Vatican, Rome, available at V & A
printroom and Photographic Archives of the Warburg Institute (on file with authors).
According to B. ROWLAND, BIRDS WITH HUMAN SOULs 112-15 (1978), the ostrich was known in
the Renaissance for its odd dietary habits (eating anything, including metal) and was sometimes
linked with the sin of gluttony. On the other hand, the ostrich's assumed ability to eat metal led some
to note its "valor or endurance." Id. at 112. One Renaissance iconographer stated that the ostrich was
an emblem of Justice because "the ostrich ruminates its food as Justice should the testimony put
before her." Id. at 115 (translating Ripa, discussed infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text). Be-
cause the ostrich put its head in the ground, others used the ostrich to indicate forgetfulness and
stupidity. A more flattering association is provided by Horapollo: "[The feather of an ostrich symbol-
ized a man who distributed justice impartially, 'for this bird has the feathers of its wings equal on
every side, beyond all other birds.'" Id. at 114.
40. See, e.g., Albrecht Dfirer,Justice with Crane (between 1495-1499), reproduced in 0. KIssEL,
supra note 5, at 43, plate 29; prints after Dfirer, in Photographic Archives of the Warburg Institute,
London (copies on file with authors). The crane is shown standing on one leg, with a globe held in an
upraised claw. According to B. ROWLAND, supra note 39, at 32, the crane had a reputation for
"vigilance." The crane held a pebble in its foot, indicating "watchfulness and prudence," in turn
"often associated with Justice." Id. at 32-33. (Presumably if the bird dozed, it would drop the pebble,
causing the bird to awaken.) Moreover, "Ripa regarded the crane in flight as the emblem of an
inquisitive man investigating sublime things at a distance." Id. at 34.
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rope and the United States; advertisements and cartoons draw upon our
familiarity with this image to make their points."1 As noted above, how-
ever, Justice is the only one of several aspirational images of virtues and
vices widely used in allegorical depictions that survives as a popular image
today. We assume that the survival of her image is related, at least in
part, to the conscious use of justice imagery by governments seeking to
legitimate their exercises of power by associating themselves with the con-
cept of justice implicit in the imagery.
We cannot provide a comprehensive history of the many polities from
Athens to Washington in which depictions appeared of Justice, of ideal-
ized impersonal judges, and of the process of judgment. Rather, we pro-
vide a few examples (drawn primarily from Italy and Northern Europe)
of occasions on which sovereigns seem deliberately to have displayed Jus-
tice, judges, or judgments, in efforts to teach, inspire, pacify, or otherwise
influence viewers. From what we know of the displays, we can speculate
on the political aspirations of those who showed us, and taught us to read,
justice imagery.
One early example comes from Roman coins. According to Barbara
Lichocka, Roman emperors represented themselves as embodiments of the
four Platonic virtues of courage, wisdom, temperance, and justice. Al-
though images of Justice on Roman coins were relatively rare,42 Lichocka
believes that emperors used Justice imagery to popularize themselves by
linking their names (and sometimes stylized versions of their images) with
those of Justice (as well as with other virtues) on one of the few forms of
official documents of the age-coins."'
Medieval examples of justice imagery include more than Justice herself.
Images of judgment and of the figure of the judge were also displayed in
public places. When Justice appears in early medieval depictions, she
often joins the other virtues in depictions of Christian themes.4 For ex-
ample, in illuminated manuscripts that have survived, Justice is often seen
as one of the virtues doing battle with the vices in the struggle for souls.4 5
Justice also appears in some civic buildings-apparently in an effort to
41. For example, the advertisement for the movie From the Hip depicts a "young maverick law-
yer" opening his shirt to show a T-shirt underneath decorated with a dancing Justice, scales atilt.
L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 1987, § 6, at 17, col. 1; see also Conrad, The Onion Field II, L.A. Times, Jan.
1, 1987, § 1, at 5, col. 1 (cartoon depicting robed fleeing man, labeled "California Justice System,"
leaving blindfolded, murdered Justice, scales and sword strewn about her, in reference to former Chief
Justice Rose Bird's defeat in the November 1986 elections).
42. Lichocka, supra note 7, at 54-61. For an example of such an image, see 0. KISSEL, supra
note 5, at 24, plate 11 (Roman coin depicting Justitia, with scales, from reign of Marcus Aurelius).
43. Lichocka, supra note 7, at 62-66.
44. M. EVANS, supra note 8, plates 20, 34 & 35. See generally A. KArZENELLENBOGEN, supra
note 8, at 31-36.
45. See supra note 11.
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suggest that the sovereign embodied this virtue. A particularly good exam-
ple is in Ambrogio Lorenzetti's well-known fresco, Allegory of Good Gov-
ernment, in Siena's Palazzo Pubblico."' In the picture, the central figure
is Buon Commune-the common good. The theological virtues of Faith,
Hope, and Charity are represented by female figures above the head of
Buon Commune, who seems to be a mixture of Jesus and emperor.47
Other virtues-Peace, Fortitude, Prudence, Magnanimity, Temperance,
and Justice-surround Buon Commune. Unlike the other virtues de-
picted, however, Justice appears twice in this scene, and once in a size
much larger than the other virtues."" Each of the two Justices bears a
label. On the left, the larger Justice figure is called both Distributive Jus-
tice and Commutative Justice-apparently in reference to St. Thomas
Aquinas' descriptions of Aristotelian concepts of justice.49 According to
Professor Edgerton, Distributive Justice is Ambrogio's attempt to allego-
rize the community's obligations to reward or to punish citizens who excel
or fail in their public duties, while Commutative Justice represents "'mu-
tual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and in other kinds of
intercourse and exchange.' "50 Above the larger Justice's head is Wisdom,
who holds a scale, and below this Justice is Concord. To the far right sits
the smaller Justice figure, who is labeled "Vindictive Justice," and who
holds a sword. On her knee lies a severed head. Below her are a group of
people, held together by a rope.5 The fresco is not simply an example of
the "golden age" of Sienese art; the subject matter, organization, referen-
tial quality, labeling, and site of the Allegory of Good Government
demonstrate that it was intended to have an inspirational and educational
effect upon those who visited Siena's Town Hall.52
Such depictions of the cardinal virtues in secular scenes in civic build-
ings were part of a trend in Italy and elsewhere.53 Helen North believes
that political efforts to incorporate the ancient virtues were evident as
46. See S. EDGERTON, supra note 8, at 36, plate 7.
47. Id. at 37.
48. Id. at 38. The second depiction of Justice may refer to the Platonic notion of Justice as the
virtue required by and superior to the others.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting Rubenstein, Political Ideas in Sienese Art: The Frescoes of Ambrogio Lorenzetti
and Taddeo di Bartolo in the Palazzo Pubblico, 21 J. WARBURG & COURTAULD INSTS. 179,
182-83 (1958) (Aquinas' description of Commutative Justice) (footnote omitted)).
51. Edgerton believes these people to be prisoners. S. EDGERTON, supra note 8, at 39. On Am-
brogio Lorenzetti, see Tuve, Notes Part One, supra note 11, at 290-92; M. WARNER, supra note 4,
at 154-57.
52. On the didacticism of later Sienese painting, see B. COLE, SIENESE PAINTING IN THE AGE OF
THE RENAISSANCE 166 (1985).
53. H. NORTH, supra note 6, at 223. There was also a mixture of the secular in the sacred. For
example, in St. Janskirk in Gouda, Netherlands, Justice (and other virtues) appear in some stained
glass windows installed after the Reformation. Society for the Study of Gouda Windows, The Stained
Glass Windows of St. Johns Church, Gouda 1-2, 17-18 (pamphlet, undated, on file with authors).
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early as Charlemagne's era, but that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centu-
ries, political leaders of the city-states in Italy were particularly intent
upon prominent display of and association with both cardinal and theolog-
ical virtues."' We have found a parallel interest extant in the sixteenth
century in other regions. For example, Justice and the other virtues
graced the designs for coats of arms of many burgher states in middle
Europe.55
During the later Middle Ages, scenes of the Day of Judgment and of
earthly instances of judging also began to adorn the walls of civic build-
ings. Ruling polities showed scenes of judgment, both divine and secular,
in an apparent effort to link the two.56 In these pictures, Jesus often takes
the position of judge; in some instances, the Virgin Mary is blurred with
Justice.57 In these Last Judgment tableaux, the judge condemns the sir-
ners to hell and raises the virtuous to heaven.
By the time of the Renaissance, such pictures became increasingly com-
mon. As Professor Edgerton relates, while such depictions were occasion-
ally placed in communal buildings in Italy, "[d]uring the fifteenth and
especially the sixteenth century in northern Europe it became standard
practice to have a Last Judgment painted on the wall behind the judges'
bench.""8 One fifteenth century painting showed a municipal court below
with Jesus and his heavenly court directly above.5" Craig Harbison com-
ments that "the most noteworthy feature of the Last Judgments located in
Town Halls is their position in a totally profane environment."60 Further,
such images appeared not only in secular rooms, but also in books of town
54. Id. at 223, 225-27.
55. See C. KAUFFMANN, supra note 38, catalogue no. 28 (describing Stocklin, Design (ca.
1625-30) (arms of City of Basle supported by 'two cockatrices)); id. catalogue no. 13 (describing
Plepp, Design (ca. 1557-97) (arms of City of Basle supported by two lions rampant)).
56. See S. EDGERTON, supra note 8, at 22-23. Often, two scenes were depicted, with divine
judgment above and earthly justice below. Sometimes, a single image combines the divine and the
secular. One of Diirer's best known prints is SolJustitiae, executed around 1500, in which a male
figure, often described as Jesus, appears as a judge. See 0. KISSEL, supra note 5, at 39, plate 26;
DORER, supra note 20, at 52-53, plate 25. According to Strauss, the editor of Dfirer, the print's
source was Petrus Berchorius' Repertorium Morale. DORER, supra note 20, at 52 ("The Sun of
Righteousness shall appear ablaze when he will judge mankind on the day of doom . . ").
57. S. EDGERTON, supra note 8, at 22-23, 38. In some Italian communal buildings, images of the
Virgin Mary were accompanied by the inscription, "Odi l'altra parte!" (Hear the other side!). Id. at
52 n.38; cf. Shorr, The Role of the Virgin in Giotto's Last Judgment, 38 ART BULL. 207 (1956)
(painting "emphasizes in a particular way her close relationship to mankind and the intimate role
that she plays in its salvation at the Day of Judgment"). See generally P. GOLD, THE LADY AND THE
VIRGIN (1985) (relationship of icongraphy of Virgin Mary and of secular "dame" of romance litera-
ture to societal role of women). Injunctions mandating impartiality were not restricted to Northern
Italy. In the Town Hall of Gouda, Holland;built between 1448-1459, the Latin inscription Audite et
Alteram Partem (Hear also the other side) appears above the entry door.
58. S. EDGERTON, supra note 8, at 32-33.
59. Id.
60. C. HARBISON, THE LAST JUDGMENT IN SIXTEENTH CENTURY NORTHERN EUROPE: A
STUDY IN THE RELATION BETWEEN ART AND THE REFORMATION 52 (1976).
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laws and regulations." In Harbison's view, "[t]he use of Last Judgments
in town council and judgment chambers should be considered in conjunc-
tion with a related but more widespread development-the use of justice
pictures in general as prototypes or archetypes for a more earthly, contem-
porary, and immediate adjudicating act."'6 2 While noting some of the dif-
ferences between the Last Judgments designed for secular rather than sa-
cred locations,6" Harbison argues that the depictions were efforts to
legitimate and elevate secular activities by suggesting an association with
the sacred.64
What else might explain the placement of Justice and judgment scenes
in many public places? Edgerton's theory is that the increasingly secular
societies of the city-states in Italy sought "spiritual affirmation that their
urban way of life was just as God-annointed as the old feudal vision of
society."6 Harbison suggests that in Northern Europe, the Reformation
and secularization gave impetus to a need for propaganda to reassure
members of society that earthly decisions paralleled heavenly ones.68 As
the world was moving away from the equation of rulers with the divine,
rulers nonetheless sought to persuade their citizens that they, the rulers,
embodied qualities associated with the divine, and that the ruling polity
could render justice as did God.
What is important-but difficult from a twentieth century perspec-
tive-to appreciate is the power that all these images may have had for
contemporary viewers. In a world without printed books, a world in
which few were literate, a world with few images, what was it like to look
at such pictures? Medieval and Renaissance art was intended to be didac-
tic and to transmit a vivid message,67 and images were elements of a mys-
ticism quite at odds with the subsequent ages of rationality.6 In the
eighth century, one commentator stated: "Images speak, they are neither
mute nor lifeless blocks . . . .Images open the heart and awake the intel-
lect, and, in a marvelous and indescribable manner, engage us to imitate
the persons they represent."69 And, according to Professor Gombrich,
while allegorical pictures were translations of intellectual messages into
61. Id. at 54.
62. Id. at 60.
63. Id. at 62.
64. Id. at 62-64.
65. S. EDGERTON, supra note 8, at 22.
66. C. HARBISON, supra note 60, at 61-64; see also Harbison, Introduction to SYMBOLS IN
TRANSFORMATION: ICONOGRAPHIC THEMES AT THE TIME OF THE REFORMATION 15-16 (1969)
(exhibition catalogue of Princeton University Art Museum).
67. See Roberts & Weisberg, supra note 11, at 28.
68. Id. at 33-37. See generally E. KANTOROWIcZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A STUDY IN ME-
DIAEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957).
69. Sir John Damascenus, quoted in 1 A. DIDRON, CHRISTIAN ICONOGRAPHY 3 (E. Millington
trans. n.d.); see also Roberts & Weisberg, supra note 11, at 33.
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visual form, these pictures were something more: The symbolic import
was connected to, and to some extent merged with, reality. In other words,
the viewer would have experienced a correspondence between the picture
and the abstract idea depicted. According to Gombrich, the onlooker
would perceive the concept directly rather than by a pattern of interpreta-
tion dependent upon sequential thought. Thus, the visual symbol not only
represented but somehow became interchangeable with what it
represented.70
While one cannot recover all that an image might have conveyed," a
consistent theme emerges: a political community holding out the image of
Justice or of divine judgment in the places in which officers of the polity
made their judgments and conducted civic business. Moreover, although
sovereigns once allied themselves with all of the cardinal and theological
virtues, over time Justice moved to a more prominent position than that of
the other virtues. In Ambrogio's fresco in Siena, Justice appears twice and
is in both instances larger than her sisters. In the Vatican, Raphael de-
picts her repeatedly.72 In the Netherlands, statues of Justice can be found
on seventeenth century town halls, including those of Haarlem and Delft.
And, as one moves forward in time, allegorical depictions of the other
virtues diminish while images of Justice continue to be commissioned. In
Hampton Court Palace in England, a painting by Verrio, dated approxi-
mately 1704, shows Queen Anne as Justice,3 a sign that the English
monarchy appropriated Justice as its own. See Figure 3. After the monar-
chy lost its authority, Parliament maintained a proprietary interest in
Justice, who was placed atop London's criminal courthouse, Old Bailey.
In many parts of Europe and in the United States, Justice stands as the
lone virtue depicted. Several courthouses built in the United States during
the nineteenth and, to a lesser extent, the twentieth centuries include Jus-
tice as part of the decor.7
More than happenstance has led rulers continually to claim a connec-
tion with Justice, while slowly relinquishing their identification with and
70. E. GOMBRICH, SYMBOLIC IMAGES: STUDIES IN THE ART OF THE RENAISSANCE II 123-91
(3d ed. 1985).
71. See generally S. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY 53-78 (1942).
72. See ALL THE FREACOS OF RAPHAEL pt. 1, plate 7, pt. 2, plate 158a (B. Camesasca ed., P.
Colacicchi trans. 1963).
73. Verrio's painting in Hampton Court Palace, described in R. NASH, HAMPTON COURT 145
(1983) (apparently Verrio was never compensated for the work); see also Rubens, The Felicity of the
Regency (1625), Louvre, Paris (depicting Queen Marie de Medici holding scales of justice), repro-
duced in F. BAUDOUIN, PIETRO PAOLO RUBENS 227, plate 60 (1977); Pierre Paul Prud'hon, Justice
and Divine Vengeance Pursuing Crime (1808), Louvre, Paris (commissioned to hang behind judges'
bench in criminal court of Palais de Justice in Paris). For a discussion of the artistic genesis and
history of the Prud'hon painting, see Weston, Prud'hon: Justice and Vengeance, 117 BURLINGTON
MAG. 353, 353-57 (1975).
74. See, e.g., COURT HOUSE, supra note 15.
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deployment of the other virtues. The imposition of judgment, with its req-
uisite violence,7 5 is an essential, inevitable aspect of governance. How con-
venient, how distancing from human subjectivity and fallibility, if such
decisions go forth in the name of Justice. As kings lost their claims of
divinity and as countries lost their kings, governing bodies nonetheless in-
sisted on maintaining an affiliation between their states and the imagery
of justice. A picture or sculpture of a woman with sword and scales and a
painting of the Day of Judgment suggested that a sovereignty could right-
fully pronounce judgments.
For twentieth century observers, the idea of such pictures as powerful,
or even didactic, is problematic. In a generation comfortable with indeter-
minacy and with the intricacies of semiotic interpretations, claims that
pictures "mean" anything are to be approached with caution.7 ' But medi-
eval and Renaissance texts suggest that both artists and viewers of those
eras looked with different sensibilities upon allegorical and metaphoric
imagery. For example, Cesare Ripa, the sixteenth century compiler of the
iconography of his era, 7 produced an encyclopedia, Iconologia, to provide
a "description and classification of images."78 Ripa's Iconologia was pop-
ular,79 and scholars believe that it captured for the period the "fairly com-
mon agreement on the way in which ideas, often very abstract ones, could
be intelligibly and effectively represented visually."8 0 According to one
translation, Ripa tells us that:
The personification of Justice is a blindfolded woman robed in
white and wearing a crown. . . . She supports a pair of scales in
her lap with one hand. Her other hand holds a bared upright sword,
and rests on a bundle of lictors' rods [fasces], from around which a
serpent is unwinding. A dog lies at her feet. On the table are a scep-
ter, some books, and a skull.
She is robed in white, for the judge must be without moral blem-
ish which might impair his judgment and obstruct true justice. She is
blindfolded, for nothing but pure reason, not the often misleading
evidence of the senses, should be used in making judgments. She is
regally dressed, for justice is the noblest and most splendid of con-
cepts. The scale, used to measure quantities of material things, is a
75. Violence and the Word, supra note 2, at 1608.
76. See generally M. BAXANDALL, PATTERNS OF INTENTION (1985).
77. See Maser, Introduction to C. RIPA (Maser ed.), supra note 16, at viii-xix (explaining Ico-
nologia). The full text of the original version of the Iconologia, first published in 1593, has not to our
knowledge been translated into English. The earliest English version we have found is G. Richard-
son's 1777 edition, which, like the Maser translation, is a selective rendition. Our thanks go to Jen-
nifer Montagu for some impromptu translations of one of the early seventeenth century Ripa editions.
78. This definition of "iconography," applied by C. RIPA (Maser ed.), supra note 16, at viii, is
from E. PANOFSKY, MEANING IN THE VISUAL ARTS 26 (1955).
79. C. RIPA (Maser ed.), supra note 16, at x-xi; see also H. NORTH, supra note 6, at 250.
80. C. RIPA (Maser ed.), supra note 16, at vii.
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metaphor for justice, which sees that each man receives that which is
due him, no more and no less. The sword represents the rigor of
justice, which does not hesitate to punish. The same meaning is em-
bodied by the lictors' rods, the Roman symbol of the judge's power to
punish and even execute. The snake and the dog represent hatred
and friendship, neither of which must be allowed to influence true
justice. The scepter is a symbol of authority; the books, of written
law; and the skull, of human mortality, which justice does not suffer,
for it is eternal .... 81
We turn in the next sections of this essay to alternative interpretations
of some of the attributes that Ripa describes. For now, in Ripa's descrip-
tion we find a Justice that all governments might well hope would be
equated with the rulings they impose.
III. THE Two TRADITIONS: THE IDEAL AND THE GROTESQUE
While most of Ripa's discussion is directed towards the heroic, positive
aspects of Justice, there are elements of his description that imply a
darker side and suggest a Justice gone awry. The dog and the snake are,
Ripa explains, reminders that both friendship and hatred could corrupt
judgment. But there are visual reminders more graphic than the inclusion
of a dog and a snake in a picture. The pictorial history is rich with frank
acknowledgements of the problematic posture of real judges and even of
idealized Justice. Yet, unlike the inspirational images of Justice found in
public buildings of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, much of the
negative imagery of prior centuries has been relegated to archives.
Consider, for example, the myth of Cambyses, translated with some
regularity in paintings, drawings, and prints from the fifteenth through
seventeenth centuries.8" See Figures 5a and 5b. Herodotus tells us that
when Cambyses ruled Persia, he had the corrupt judge Sisamnes flayed
alive. Cambyses then appointed Sisamnes's son, Otanes, to succeed his fa-
ther as judge. Cambyses required that Otanes sit upon a seat made of his
father's skin.8" In the late fifteenth century, when the Flemish artist Ge-
rard David was commissioned to paint panels for the Bruges "Hall of
81. C. RIPA (Maser ed.), supra note 16, at 120. Because there were multiple "original" editions
of Ripa, and because we have heard oral translations of other editions, we wish to underscore the
impact of the translator on the text. For a description of the many editions, see id. at ix-xix. For
references to attributes not described in the Maser edition, see, e.g., B. ROWLAND, supra note 39, at
114-15 (citing Ripa's inclusion of an ostrich as an attribute of Justice).
82. See, e.g., Plepp, Design, supra note 55 ("on the left, King Cambyses with the son of the
unjust judge, whose flayed skin hanging above his seat acts as a warning to other judges") in C.
KAUFFMANN, supra note 38; see also Cambyses medal (1550), described in Gans' and Kisch's ex-
change in The Cambyses Justice Medal, 29 ART BuLL. 121 (1947).
83. See HERODoTus, THE HIsroRis bk. V, at 349 (A. de S6lincourt trans. 1972).
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Sheriffs," he painted the "horrific" Flaying of Sisamnes.4 These two
large panels are vividly colored and visually powerful. The black and
white reproduction cannot transmit the stomach-churning impact of the
flaying. In that panel, a near life-sized Sisamnes, his face contorted in
agony, stares upward as his skin is peeled away to reveal the bloody flesh
underneath. The story and images were of sufficient currency to be cast in
sixteenth century medals 5 and to be included as part of a discussion of
Injustice in one of the several translations of Ripa.86 But the images the
tale conjures up have been lost to popular discourse.
Les Juges aux Mains Couples (The judges with Hands Cut Off), a
late fifteenth/early sixteenth century fresco from the Geneva Town Hall,
is another startling image.8 7 See Figure 4. Such a depiction-of judges,
and occasionally of Justice herself, without hands-is not unique to the
town hall of Geneva. Plutarch spoke of the judges of Thebes who had no
hands; his story might have been a source for the Geneva painting."8 Six-
teenth century designs for Swiss stained glass windows include a Justice
accompanied by two putti (cherub-like figures), one of whom has its
hands cut off.8" See Figure 7. Further, Professor Michael Evans has
found a blind Justice, with arms amputated below the shoulder, in Ger-
man manuscripts of the fifteenth century.9"
Comparable images do not seem to appear in public buildings in the
84. See Mundy, supra note 25, at 122-23. We do not know whether the artist or those who
commissioned the work chose its theme. One can look at the pictures as reminders of kingly power
and authority. Some commentators have suggested a link between Bruges' conflict with Maximilian
(in approximately 1488) and the decision to depict the Cambyses story. Bruges' officials had impris-
oned Maximilian in 1488, thereby incurring the enmity of that monarch. Some art historians believe
that the painting is a reference to this incident, while other art historians have rejected the theory, in
part because by the time the painting was completed and paid for (1498), the political situation had
changed, and in part because other Cambyses portrayals appear, around the same time, in other town
halls. See D. DE Vos, BRUGGE MUSEES COMMUNAUX CATALOGUE DES TABLEAUX, 15e et 16e
Siicles 121-25 (1982); see also D. DE Vos, GROENINGE MUSEUM 25-27(Vermeersch & Duvosquel
eds. 1983).
85. See Gans, Kisch, supra note 82, at 121.
86. See C. RIPA (Maser ed.), supra note 16, at 117. Maser selected the engravings from the
Hertel edition of Ripa, dating from the mid-eighteenth century. Id. at xv-xix.
87. See Deonna, supra note 24.
88. See PLUTARCH, Isis and Osiris, in 5 MORALTA 27 (F. Babbitt trans. 1926) (no. 10). In
Deonna's view, the Geneva judges are a reference to Plutarch's discussion of the judges of
Thebes-that the judges had no hands, and that the chief judge had closed eyes-"c'tait faire com-
prendre que la Justice ne doit ni accepter de presents, ni laisser approcher personne jusqu'A elle" (It
was to make clear that Justice is not influenced by gifts or by intercession.). Deonna, supra note 24,
at 141.
89. Murer, Design (1586), reproduced in C. KAUFFMANN, supra note 38, catalogue no. 17 Jus-
tice depicted holding sword and scales with two cupids in upper comer: "[T]he one on the left holds a
crown and sceptre, symbolising the sovereignty of Justice, the other is blinkered and has his hands cut
off at the wrist. This is an ancient if relatively rare attribute of Justice, symbolizing the refusal to take
bribes.").
90. See Evans, supra note 6, at 12-14. According to Evans, Plutarch's discussion of Thebes'
judges who were without hands was probably not accessible at the time when the idea of a maimed
Justice re-emerged in the 1530's. Id. at 14-15.
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Figure 7. Christopher Murer, Design for Swiss stained glass window
(1586). Reproduced with permission of the Victoria and Albert Mu-
seum, London, England.
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, in this century, attempts to
portray Justice in other than a purified manner have met with contro-
versy. For example, Gustav Klimt painted-with "bony specificity" and
"severity"-a woman he called Jurisprudence, floating high above a pun-
ishment scene populated by three naked women and a naked, bowed, aged
man caught in the tentacles of an octopus. 1 Klimt's portrayal of Juris-
prudence never was displayed on the walls of the University of Vienna,
for which it had been commissioned. Although full of ambiguities, Klimt's
vision is a harsh one-at odds with the bland, inspirational Justices that
we see today. Those who have commissioned the portraits of Justice dur-
ing recent centuries seem generally to have had little interest in renditions
of handless figures, of depictions of judges sitting on their father's skins,
or of the miseries of punishment that flow from judgment. 2
What are we to make of the placement of the Flaying of Sisamnes and
Les Juges Aux Mains Couples in civic buildings? One possibility is that
we read these images as being more aggressive than did those who saw
them originally. As Professor Edgerton documents, what today may seem
to be brutally painful images of punishment-in Last Judgment paintings
and elsewhere-were common from the fourteenth to the sixteenth cen-
tury in Florence." Further north, Hieronymus Bosch painted similarly
harsh (to our eyes) images of the Last Judgment and of the Deadly Sins.94
Perhaps sensibilities have changed over time; what we register as gro-
tesque imagery today may not have been understood contemporaneously
in the same way.
Edgerton's view, however, is that harsh paintings of punishment were
intended and received as such, and that such pictures were explicitly di-
dactic efforts of the state.9 5 But if the images of Sisamnes and the handless
judges were read as harsh, why were such painful pictures-reminders of
corruption and of possible weakness-placed in town halls? Why show
judges who are prevented both from receiving bribes and grasping for fa-
vors only because they lack hands? We do not know the full account of
the commissioning or the painting of these pictures. Perhaps in each local-
ity, some story lost to us today explains the images.
But there are other possibilities. These images were painted at a time
when secular courts were developing and when judges were becoming a
group of employees somewhat distinct from the sovereign. Perhaps these
images are parallels to the "folktales" Bob Cover told-of Simeon ben
91. See K. VARNEDOE, supra note 14, at 153-55 (with photograph).
92. Not only the grotesque has slipped from view. The ostrich and the crane, portrayed occasion-
ally beside Renaissance Justices, have also disappeared. See supra notes 39-40.
93. See S. EDGERTON, supra note 8, at 88-95.
94. See C. LINFERT, HIERONYMus BoscH plates 1-6, 68-69 (J. Spencer trans. 1959).
95. See S. EDGERTON, supra note 8, at 59-90, 126-64.
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Shetah and King Yannai, of Lord Coke and King James I, of Judge Stern
and the State Department, of judges being threatened by governments that
sought to coerce acts in accordance with the sovereign's wishes. 8 In each
of these stories, a confrontation between sovereign and judge requires a
judge to attempt to stand separate from his sovereign, to call a sovereign to
judgment, or to disagree with the judgment preferred by the sovereign.
Unlike Bob's narratives, however, of heroic judges who stand up to a
sovereign's pressures even in the face of bodily harm or loss of their jobs,
we find medieval and Renaissance images of judges warned, limited, and
curbed by their kings. Cambyses had the judge flayed and then made the
son take the judgment seat fashioned from his father's skin. An inscription
on one of the mid-sixteenth century medals that depicts the Cambyses
story states: "Cambyses maintained the law and administered it justly, as
one can perceive here from the punishment. '9 7 While Herodotus' descrip-
tion of Cambyses suggests a king gone mad,"' a Renaissance reinterpreta-
tion is of a king in appropriate control of the judiciary. Sovereigns of that
era may well have found utility in reminding the populace of their power
(and perhaps, their willingness to use it) or in warning their judges of the
retribution that would follow if judges displeased them."9
Yet another possibility is that, in a world in which one had confidence
in Divine Justice and had faith in the fabulous justice of a God who
would provide ultimate fairness, one could afford to admit the possibility
that earthly justice was fallible.100 Both the paintings of Sisamnes and of
the handless judges are of judges, not Justice. Further, the Geneva Town
Hall also had Justice on its walls; she is regally enthroned, with sword
and scales-and with arms and hands."' Indeed, while Professor Evans
reports that a few armless Justices exist, he describes them as "anomalies
among medieval representations of Justice. '1 0 2
But we do not want to press the judge-not-Justice theory too far. Al-
though not common, armless and handless Justices do exist, and the idea
of showing a judge without hands is an ancient one. The physical disfig-
urement is aimed at moral enlightenment. Accompanying one handless
96. Folktales of Justice, supra note 2, at 184, 187-88; Violence and the Word, supra note 2, at
1619-21.
97. Gans, Kisch, supra note 82, at 121. The medal was struck in Germany.
98. HERODOTUS, supra note 83, at 217-19, 229; see also id. bk. III, at 1-66.
99. In the encounter between Simeon Ben Shetah and King Yannai, the fear of displeasing the
earthly king is compared with the penalty exacted by the divine king. After all the other judges had
failed to stand up to the King, the "courageous judge" Simeon Ben Shetah said, "'Let the Master of
thoughts come and call you to account.' Instantly, Gabriel came and smote them all and they died."
Folktales of Justice, supra note 2, at 184; see also infra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
100. See E. PANOFSKY, supra note 11, at 109 n.48 (1972) (early edition of Ripa limits use of
blindfold to Worldly Justice). See generally J. Shaw, supra note 8, at 31.
101. Deonna, supra note 24, at plate 44 (following 136) (figure 10).
102. Evans, supra note 6, at 12.
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Justice is the inscription: "She has no hands so that she shall not be too
gentle or too harsh."1 ' Hence, the aspiration (on the textual surface) is to
a fair judgment, but the disquieting image reminds all who face judgment
that fairness has not always been achieved, that the missing hands may
have held bribes or have punished too brutally. These images are power-
ful because they allude not only to Justice but also to the act of judgment
and to the pain that accompanies it.1 04 As Professor Tuve well explained:
"With Justice, matters are yet more complicated, for it is the most inter-
esting virtue, the one most related to metaphysics and the definitions of
Deity, most caught up in double entendres during centuries . . .when
every Western man . . . conscious of the Vulgate [Bible] uses translated
iustitia: righteousness."10 5
While the ability to recognize a figure as Justice when she is portrayed
according to the specifications of Ripa has endured, most of us are not
familiar with images of handless judges. What might be signified by the
current absence of these painful images? Does our government have little
use for a grotesque Justice, with her vivid cues about the very human
defects of the justice system? That the United States does not wish to
remind us or its judges of their vulnerability to a powerful sovereign?
That judges are no longer vulnerable to powerful sovereigns? Or is it
simply that the time for allegorical imagery has passed, that in a world in
which everyone can be "famous for fifteen minutes,"' 8 and in which
images abound and bombard, icons can no longer exist?
IV. THE VISUAL CUES TO A PROBLEMATIC JUSTICE
A first question is whether justice imagery has been drained of all that
is painful, has been so sanitized that only benign or sympathetic aspects
remain. Do the attributes that are standard today-sword, scales, and
blindfold-bring forth only positive associations? Commentators of our
generation cannot claim that only a single interpretation is "correct" or
even cognitively possible.1 0 7 The sword need not only represent, in Ripa's
words, the "rigor of justice," but may also mean cruelty or an unwilling-
ness to reach compromises. Remember, after all, the tale of Solomon, who
offered to use the sword to cut the child in half, to give each claimant her
share.108 Contemporary critics of adjudication in the United States be-
103. Id.
104. Violence and the Word, supra note 2, at 1607.
105. R. TUVE, supra note 8, at 66.
106. Andy Warhol, Catalogue of Photo Exhibition (1968), Stockholm, quoted in J. BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 908 (15th ed. 1980).
107. See generally R. GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY (1981).
108. See Minow, The Judgment of Solomon and the Experience of Justice, in R. CovFR & 0.
Flss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 447 (1979).
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moan what they perceive as the rigidity of court-based remedies and argue
for alternatives to adjudication to provide for greater justice. For them, the
sword may represent only the limitations of formal Justice.1 9 Similarly,
while the scales may be the mechanism by which, again according to
Ripa, a person "receives that which is due. . no more and no less," the
scales can also prompt other associations. The scales, like the sword, have
potential for absolute rather than compromised outcomes; souls are
weighed and sent to eternal life or damnation.110 The scales were associ-
ated classically with the Greek goddesses of opportunity, victory, and ret-
ribution as well as with Justice.11 Sword and scales need not only remind
us that Justice can be powerful and correct; they can also be interpreted
as indications of Justice as harsh, unsympathetic, and unyielding.
Consider also the many meanings possible for the blindfold. The blind-
fold is a relatively late addition to the imagery of Justice. Although Plu-
tarch wrote about the Chief Judge of Thebes whose eyes were closed,112
most images of Justice before the sixteenth century did not include
blindfolds. Hundreds of images-statues, illustrated manuscripts, paint-
ings-depicted Justice with eyes open.11 The images began to change
during the sixteenth century; thereafter, some depictions showed a wide-
eyed Justice while others depicted her blindfolded. By the time of Ripa,
the blindfold was sufficiently common to be included in his iconography.
Ripa's claim about the blindfold is a positive one; his instructions would
have us understand that Justice is blindfolded to avoid the "misleading
evidence of the senses." 14 Unlike ordinary individuals, Justice must not
be led astray by information that could undermine her judgments. Bob
Cover used the blindfold to construct his own folktale of justice, a story of
a volitional act of constraint to enable better judgment. Bob's blindfolded
Justitia captures both the aspirations of mythic judges and the problems
109. See generally Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485 (1985); Menkel-Meadow, Toward An-
other View of Legal Negotiations: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984)
(criticizing zero-sum approach to dispute settlement).
110. See Daube, supra note 32, at 113-15; Perry, supra note 32; see also Wormald, The Crucifix
and the Balance, 1 J. WARBURG INsT. 276 (1937-38) (tracing imagery of Crucifix as balance upon
which sins are weighed).
111. Daube, supra note 32, at 114.
112. Evans, supra note 6, at 14 (chief justice represented with closed eyes to signify that "justice
is inaccessible to persuasion"); cf. E. PANOFSKY, supra note 11, at 109 n.48 (Plutarch's chief justice
"shown eyeless in order to illustrate his impartiality.").
113. Many examples can be found under the "Justice" category in the "Virtues" and "Vices"
files of the Warburg Institute's Photographic Archives. See also 0. KiSSEL, supra note 5, at 82-92.
Regional style may also affect the depictions. See supra note 38.
114. C. RIPA (Maser ed.), supra note 16, at 120. It would be interesting to learn whether all the
editions of Ripa included references to blindfolds, an attribute that was relatively late in becoming
associated with Justice and is not ubiquitous-either at the time when Ripa was writing or now.
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of judging. But there is another side (of which Bob was well aware) to the
blindfold imagery."' 5
The blindfold in iconography appears not only on Justice but also on
other figures. In these other contexts, the blindfold was used not only to
signify the distance at which the blindfolded entity stands from the cares,
pleasures, and complexities of humanity, but also to signify a failure to
see the truth. For example, medieval statues of Synagogia (representing
the Old Testament) depict that female figure as blindfolded-interpreted
by some commentators as meaning that she is blind to the light of Christi-
anity.116 Similarly, images of romance and love employ blindfolded cupids,
again read not as positive attributes but as indications of the foolishness
and confusion generated by love. Eros himself is upon occasion blind-
folded-in a possible reference to the misguided course of love.117 Another
Ambrogio Lorenzetti fresco, Good Government in the Country, painted in
approximately 1337 as a companion piece to the Allegory of Good Gov-
ernment, shows a blindfolded hanged man, with his coat blowing in the
wind. 18
In short, medieval and Renaissance imagery paid attention to light and
darkness, and many scholars of the period believe that images of darkness
and blindfolds were intended to be read as signifying the profound limita-
tions of the wearer of a blindfold.119 Further, our own associations with
blindfolds are by no means all benign, for the image of a person facing a
firing squad is of a person being blindfolded to meet her or his fate. And
different interpretations of this gesture are possible. The blindfold may
not only be placed upon the condemned individual to ease the pain of the
last few moments of life, but the blindfold may also incorporate a remnant
of the medieval censure, blaming the wearer for past inadequacies.
There are two well-known blindfolded Justices from the early Renais-
sance. The first appears in a late fifteenth century woodcut by Diirer to
illustrate a book by Sebastian Brant. Justice is shown being blindfolded
115. Bob's myth itself admits the tensions in blindfold imagery. Note the reference to Isaac's
blessing; the blind Isaac mistakenly blesses Jacob instead of Esau. Genesis 27:27.
116. See 0. KISSEL, supra note 5, at 31, plate 17 (blindfolded Synagogia with broken lance in
Bamberg, ca. 1230-1240). Synagogia (the representative of the Old Testament) and Ecclesia (the
New Church) sometimes stood at either side of a cross. See J. Shaw, supra note 8, at 11; see also
Master of the Ursula Legend, Panels of the Legend of St. Ursula, the Church and the Synagogue
(Synagogue blindfolded), reproduced in D. DE Vos, GROFNIGE MUSEUM, supra note 84, at 32;
E. PANOFSKY, supra note 11, at 110-12 & plate 79; D. PANOFSKY & E. PANOFSKY, PANDORA'S
Box 44-47 (1956) (blindfold on Vice in Mantegna's The Fall and Rescue of Foolish Humanity
meant to indicate temporary absence of sight); J. SCHRADER, A MEDIEVAL BESTIARY 38 (1986)
(Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin) (owl symbolizes darkness and hence those who rejected light
of Christianity).
117. See E. PANOFSKY, supra note 11, at 95-128.
118. S. EDGERTON, supra note 8, at 130.
119. Id.; see also J. Shaw, supra note 8, at 5-7.
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by a fool; we are told that the image is meant derisively, to indicate the
attempt to lead Justice astray by taking away her sight.120 See Figure 6.
The second, dated approximately 1554, is Pieter Brueghel's Justice, in
which a blindfolded Justice is in the middle of a large, crowded scene. In
different parts of the picture, various kinds of punishment, including
hanging, burning, scourging, and beheading, are being imposed. In the
foreground, a man is being stretched on a rack while a fluid is poured
through a funnel down his throat. Justice, accompanied by a retinue of
armed men, holds a raised sword and carries scales."' Is the blindfold a
celebration of Justice's inner wisdom or a satiric addition? Is she blind-
folded not to see the many injuries imposed in her name?
The growth in popularity of the blindfold merits discussion. Why did
this attribute come down to us, while others, such as the crane and os-
trich, have been left behind? And why today are the positive associations
of the blindfold, such as those set forth in Ripa, so prevalent, rather than
the more critical interpretations? 22 One iconographical explanation is
suggested by Professor Evans. Sometime in the 1500's, Renaissance cul-
ture recovered many ancient writings, including those of Plutarch, whose
description of the sightless Chief Judge of Thebes may have provided a
source for artistic depictions of Justice's eyes.' 23 During the 1500's and
1600's, one finds not only blindfolded Justices, but also Justices with eyes
visible behind a mask.' 24 The Plutarch reference, coupled with Ripa's
description, may have provided touchstones for such images.
A political explanation is offered by Judge Otto Kissel, who notes that
the blindfold became a popular attribute of Justice during the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. Kissel argues that inclusion of the blindfold in
Justice imagery coincided with the establishment of professional, indepen-
dent judges, who stood apart from the sovereign and were not simply act-
ing at its behest.' 25 Justice blindfolded cannot see the signals a sovereign
120. See 0. KISSEL, supra note 5, at 39, plate 27; J. Shaw, supra note 8, at 15-17; Simmonds,
The Blindfold of Justice, 63 A.B.A. J. 1164 (1977).
121. Brueghel's work hangs in the Royal Library, Brussels. See 0. KISSEL, supra note 5, at 67,
plate 53. The Latin inscription under the engraving reads: "The aim of the law is either through
punishment to correct him who is punished, or to improve the others by his example, or to protect the
generality by overcoming the evil." M. WARNER, supra note 4, at 158; see also D. KUNZLE, THE
EARLY COMIC STRIP 162-63 (1973).
122. See Simmonds, supra note 120.
123. Evans, supra note 6, at 14. Evans notes that, in 1564, a Latin translation of Plutarch was
published in Louvain, and he agrees with Deonna, supra note 24, at 141, 143, that the description of
the judges of Thebes was a source for the frescos in the City Hall of Geneva. See also J. Shaw, supra
note 8, at 15.
124. C. KAUFFMANN, supra note 38 (some designs show Justice with eyes visible beneath
blindfold).
125. Kissel believes that the blindfold's popularity after 1500 was related to the replacement of
lay judges by judges with legal training and to the developing distinction between the state and the
judiciary. He sees the blindfold as signifying the need for the employee, the judge, not to decide cases
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might send on how to decide a case. This approach parallels Bob Cover's
discussion of King Yannai and Simeon ben Shetah. The story grows out
of attempts to explain the Talmudic phrase: "The king does not judge and
we do not judge him." ' Bob recounts, from the Babylonian Talmud, that
judges of the Sanhedrin initially called King Yannai to testify. However,
with the exception of Simeon ben Shetah, the judges were cowed in the
King's presence and refused to make demands upon him. 27 A blindfolded
Justice cannot see who comes before her, and hence cannot be impressed
by the power of the litigants or witnesses who might seek to intimidate
her. Had the judges of the Sanhedrin worn symbolic blindfolds, had they
the means (and the power) to stand apart from the sovereign, they might
not have been so frightened by the presence of King Yannai.
This "no fear or favor" theory might explain why the blindfold im-
agery endured. As notions of equality gained currency in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, it made sense to imagine a blindfolded Justice as
more fair than a Justice with sight. 2 Perhaps jurisprudential assump-
tions of natural law aided the imagination; if justice could be known from
within, insight and wisdom were not dependent upon what was perceived.
But the issue of how to decide fairly, and the relationship between that
issue and the imagery of Justice, predates the emergence of the blindfold
as one of the standard attributes of Justice. The concept of equality before
the law has roots more ancient than the "Age of Enlightenment." Bob
enjoyed a passage from the Code of Maimonides, a twelfth century compi-
lation of Jewish law, in which Maimonides explains the phrase from Le-
viticus: "In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor."1 2 ' Maimonides
asks:
What is meant by a righteous judgment? It is a judgment marked by
perfect impartiality to both litigants . . . not to show courtesy to one,
speaking softly to him, and frown upon the other, addressing him
to please the employer, the state, and he explains the subsequent popularity of the blindfold in North-
em Europe as a constant reminder of the need for impartiality (vis-a-vis the state) of the newly-
independent judiciary. 0. KISSEL, supra note 5, at 82-92.
126. Mishneh Sanhedrin 2:3, quoted in Folktales of Justice, supra note 2, at 183.
127. According to the story, Simeon ben Shetah, Chief Judge of the Sanhedrin, called upon King
Yannai to testify in a case involving the King's slave. The King challenged the court; he would only
testify if all 71 of the judges would so command him. All except Simeon ben Shetah declined to order
the King to testify. After King Yannai left, Simeon called upon God to call the weak judges into
account; the Angel Gabriel responded by killing them all. Folktales of Justice, supra note 2, at 184.
128. See E. PANOFSKY, supra note 11, at 109 ("[T]he figure of blindfold Justice in particular is a
humanistic concoction of very recent origin."). According to 0. KISSEL, supra note 5. at 92, ambiva-
lence about the blindfold persisted. In 1907, the Prussian Minister of Justice was joined by the Min-
ister for Public Works in ordering that, in new courthouses, justices not be blindfolded. Cf. Justice,
Unblindfolded, Raises Newark Row, ART DIG., Dec. 15, 1935, at 17 (reporting criticisms of
unblindfolded statue in Newark, N.J. courtroom).
129. Leviticus 19:15.
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harshly. . . .If one of the parties to a suit is well clad and the other
ill clad, the judge should say to the former, "Either dress him like
yourself before the trial is held, or dress like him, then the trial will
take place."' 30
Echoes, albeit faint, of the assumption that with sight may come imper-
missible associations can be found in contemporary law. The United
States Supreme Court has declared it unconstitutional to require a crimi-
nal defendant to be tried in prison garb."'
Interpretations of the blindfold as representing separation and distance,
as a sign of the judge apart, connote a justice somehow barred from re-
ceiving some kinds of information. The blindfold prevents the judge from
acquiring some of the knowledge that the unblinded possess. But to judge
requires knowledge, some kind of sight. How effective is a judge who is
unable to perceive the context in which the dispute arises? Will outcomes
be more fair or will such a judge be insensitive to human needs? What
should be the response to the tension between the needs of judges to know
and the fear that the knowing will corrupt the fairness of judgment? A
blindfold? Adding slits in the blindfold, as some sixteenth century artists
did?.3 2 A Janus-faced Justice, one face with eyes covered, the other with
eyes open? 33
The pictorial diversity and theoretical complexity are reflected in the
law. Like the variations in the treatment of Justice's eyes, the law's rules
have changed. In earlier times, jurors from the vicinage, individuals with
extrajudicial knowledge of the people and the events, were permitted to
judge disputes."3 Today, those very persons are disqualified as impermis-
sibly tainted, although exceptions are sometimes made when a juror's im-
partiality is challenged after the trial.3 5 Other procedural rules reflect
many different approaches for responding to the problems of knowledge.
Some jurisdictions insist upon changing judges whenever a decision of the
initial judge is reversed. Such rules are designed to avoid both the fact and
perception of judicial bias-stemming from a person's adherence to a
130. Code of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah), bk. XIV, Book of Judges, Laws of Sanhedrin, c.
xxi, paras. 1-2 (Hershman trans., Yale Judaism series).
131. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (while recognizing constitutional right of defendant
to be tried in civilian garb, Court held that defendant's failure to demand change of attire constituted
waiver of right). But compare the potential visual impact sanctioned in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970) (gagging disruptive defendant constitutionally permissible).
132. See supra note 38.
133. 0. KISSEL, supra note 5, at 120, plate 100 (Janus-faced Justice with sword and scale; illus-
tration by Jodocus Damhouder in Praxis Rerum Civilium (Antwerp 1596).
134. Kershen, Vicinage, 30 Ou.. L. REv. 1, 75-76 (1977).
135. See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120-21 (1983) (per curiam) (upholding verdict returned
by juror who was childhood friend of victim).
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prior ruling or view of the facts, or from resentment at being corrected."' 6
Other jurisdictions believe that the advantages of a judge's knowledge
about a case mandate using the same judge throughout the life of a law-
suit-whether or not appellate courts reverse judgments rendered by that
individual.137 Indeed, one federal district judge recently claimed that
higher courts are constitutionally forbidden to take a case away from
him. 138
Like the blindfolding and the removal of the blindfold, some of the most
powerful stories about judges of our era relate to issues of sight and in-
sight, permissible and impermissible knowledge. 139 Courts struggle with
implausible distinctions in their efforts to draw lines between the imper-
missible "extrajudicial knowledge" and the permissible information a
judge obtains during the course of a lawsuit.140 When Chief Justice
Rehnquist was nominated for that position, much of the debate about his
confirmation turned upon the nature and extent of his prior, partisan in-
volvement, as Assistant Attorney General, with a lawsuit that he subse-
quently judged as Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court." When the current Chief Justice of the California Supreme
Court was first considered for the position of Associate Justice on that
court, he was examined by a committee about his past record as a federal
district court judge. When asked if he had any preconceived ideas about
any issue that might go before him, he answered that he had none." 2 A
silly question, a predictably silly response. At such times, efforts to emu-
late the image of a blindfolded Justice go so far as to deny the connection
between judging and the experience of life.
We look at the blindfold and we remember these stories-of a society
hoping to legitimate its judges, of judges reminding us that they are all too
human, of the need for judges to have knowledge of and sensitivity to the
136. See generally Ratner, Disqualification of Judges for Prior Judicial Actions, 3 How. L.J.
228 (1957).
137. Note, The Assignment of Cases to Federal District Court Judges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 475
(1975).
138. See Kendall, U.S. Judge Real Refuses to Give Up Case, L.A. Times, Jan. 13, 1987, § 1, at 3,
col. 1 (pertaining to United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1986), and In re
Real, 107 S. Ct. 604 (1986)); see also Murphy, Court Tries To Gracefully Take Judge Real Off
Case, L.A. Times, Apr. 23, 1987, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
139. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803) ("Those then who con-
trovert the principle that the Constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are
reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and see
only the law.").
140. See, e.g., Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1987).
141. The case with which Rehnquist was involved was Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). See
Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (mem. of Rehnquist, J.); see also Letter from Professor Geof-
frey C. Hazard, Jr. to Senator Howard Metzenbaum (1986) (discussing legal ethics of the Justice's
decision not to disqualify himself from participating in Laird v. Tatum) (copy on file with authors).
142. Morain, Lucas Sworn In as High Court Justice, L.A. Times, Apr. 7, 1984, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
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pains and joys of life, of the impossibility of knowing enough and the need
to render judgment in the absence of adequate information or insight. We
derive some comfort-and amusement-from knowing that we are not the
first to see these tensions, the gaps between the images and the reality.
Consider therefore a late fifteenth-century fictitious dialogue written by
Battista Fiera, an Italian doctor and humanist, about how to depict Jus-
tice.14 Fiera imagined a dialogue between Andrea Mantegna (then a re-
cently deceased Renaissance painter, who had in fact painted a virtues-
and-vices scene and who today is considered one of the leading artists of
his time)"" and the allegorical figure, Momus, "born of Night," often cast
as a carping critic.1 45 In De Iusticia Pingenda (On The Painting of Jus-
tice), published around 1490,146 Fiera explores the relationship between
the pictorial and the jurisprudential. The conceit is that Mantegna has
been commissioned to paint Justice, and "as [he] heard so many conflict-
ing accounts of Justice," he consulted a series of "philosophers. 1 47 The
following exchange takes place:
Mantegna: I began with Saxus Hippolytus. He said Justice should
be represented with one eye; the eye being rather large and in the
middle of the forehead; the eyeball, for sharper discernment, deep-set
under a raised eyelid.
Momus: Suppose something happened behind her back? might she
not be taken in the rear? will she be safe enough with only one eye
in front?
* * . [I]f she had an eye at the back as well, she'd be still more
queenly and majestic.
Mantegna: Erasmus the Stoic [said] . . . [t]hat she ought to be
shown seated, and holding scales in her hand.
"But . . make her one-handed."
143. B. FIERA, DE IUSTICIA PINGENDA [ON THE PAINTING OF JUSTICE] (J. Wardrop trans.
1957). The editors of The Yale LawJournal have not been able to reach the translator, Wardrop, in
order to secure permission for the lengthy reprint from this translation. However, the Law Journal
believes that the contribution of this piece to legal scholarship nevertheless merits its reprinting here.
144. D. PANOFSKY & E. PANOFSKY, supra note 116, at 43. See generally E. TIETZE-CONRAT,
ANDREA MANTEGNA (1923).
145. Cast, Marten van Heemskerck's Momus Criticizing the Works of the Gods: A Problem of
Erasmian Iconography, 7 SimnOLUs 22 (1974) ("My name is Momus, born of Night, without a
father, the comrade of Envy. I enjoy criticizing each individual thing.").
146. B. FIERA, supra note 143. According to Wardrop's translation, id., the Latin text was pub-
lished in 1515. S. EDGERTON, supra note 8, at 222, states that the pamphlet was published in 1490.
147. B. FIE.RA, supra note 143, at 27-28. Wardrop's annotations, id. at 43-50, comment on the
real and the fictitious characters cited by Fiera.
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"So that she couldn't throw in a makeweight, of course."
[Marianus] instructed me to depict her standing, and with eyes all
over her as Argus was of old. . . . And brandishing a sword in her
hand to ward off robbers, and to protect the innocent and the unfor-
tunate ....
Astallius said she should be depicted sitting on a square marble
chair with a slightly curved back, such as there was once at Lesbos,
and measuring with a leaden rule.
Momus: To be sure, his was a milder image of Justice, since he left
out the menacing sword; and he had good reason to fear she might
have a fall. But why the leaden rule? Did he mean that Justice is
sometimes twisted? For is not the common herd, remembering her
waxen nose, 48 loud in proclaiming that she is?
Mantegna: No, he didn't mean that she is twisted; but he said she
was to govern with equity-now and then to slacken the reins.
Momus: What did Fiera say?
Mantegna: [H]e enjoined me to depict her covered with ears as well.
Momus: Why? Was he afraid that she might become deaf?
Mantegna: He was. . . [and Astallius and Fiera also said] that Jus-
tice was to put on the habit of a penitent ....
Momus: So, they want her to be mortified! But didn't it occur to
them to give her wings?
Mantegna: No one thought of that.
Momus: I am not surprised: They were afraid that she, fearing na-
kedness, might fly away again ....
Mantegna: [The Carmelite] has always maintained that Justice can-
not be depicted at all.
Momus: And there he is certainly right. If all these different opinions
of philosphers were so, I also agree with him. For how can you re-
present Justice both with one eye and many eyes; and how can you
148. According to Wardrop's notes, the reference is to "[a] proverbial usage, e.g. 'Justice is made
a nose of wax warmed, and wrought according to all mens pleasures.'" B. FIERA, supra note 143, at
49 n.30 (translator's footnotes) (quoting T. LoDGE, A MARGUERITE OF AMERICA 40 (London
1596)).
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depict her with one hand only, and yet measuring, and at the same
time weighing, and simultaneously brandishing a sword?-unless, of
course, they are all raving mad. Flatly, the thing can't be done ....
Mantegna: Justice [the Carmelite said] is the will of God ....
Momus: [W]hat about human Justice?
Mantegna: He spoke about human Justice too, and no less to the
point. Man, within the limits of his frail and fallible nature, is not
unaware of Justice, and is subject to her laws; nor can he, by any
deviation, however slight, escape them. . . . He did say that [Jus-
tice] was imprinted; from the outset so fixed in the core of our nature
that Justice and Life might be reckoned sisters. For, he said, every-
one is born with the instinct of self-protection, and with the desire to
avoid pain. But why should someone impose upon another what he
dislikes himself; and why should he grudge to others what he himself
desires?
Momus: [D]id [your theologian] ever mention any decree of this di-
vine justice that is so perfect and entire, whereby all men alike
should be put on their guard .. .?
Mantegna: Death, Momus, for everyone the last necessity, to be
avoided by none. Sooner or later, we die, Momus; Death levels us
all, the lowest and the highest: so sacred and stern is Justice.
Momus: . . . Now, Mantegna, I would no longer consider you a
painter, but rather a very great philosopher and a consummate theo-
logian, had you not portrayed Death instead of Justice. 49
Is this satire, as Professor Gombrich suggests? 5 . Irony? An insider's
joke? A more serious attempt at philosophy? Some of the references are
obvious. For example, by choosing to use Momus, Fiera evoked associa-
tions with the darkness of the night and with a highly critical perspec-
tive; 151 Momus, a nit-picking fault-finder, was surely a difficult person
with whom to explore how to achieve the ideal embodiment of Justice. If
Momus could have been satisfied, others likely would have agreed. But
149. B. FIERA, supra note 143, at 29-41.
150. E. GOMBRICH, supra note 70, at 175-76.
151. See Cast, supra note 145.
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Momus, in the end, dissented. His last comment was that Mantegna had
"portrayed Death instead of Justice." '52
How might the reference to death be understood? One possibility is
that in death there is unerring justice. Equality results because no one can
escape death. Alternatively, Momus' critique might be that, by substitut-
ing Death for Justice, Mantegna has taken an easy out; he has trivialized
the ideal of human justice. By turning to Death to depict Justice, Mante-
gna has relied upon God, at the Last Judgment, to resolve all the ambigu-
ities that earthly justice cannot.
While we cannot know how the dialogue was intended or read in its
time, readers in the twentieth century can enjoy Fiera as he tells us about
the problems of depicting the concept of justice. Fiera makes plain the
ambiguity we see in the blindfold, and he invites us to think about how
artists might have used ears or hands to evoke similar tensions. In the
dialogue we can find our hopes that justice, as depicted, simultaneously be
attuned to individual nuances and be evenhanded; that objectivity and
subjectivity both be present; that justice know all that is needed but not
know that which might corrupt or unfairly influence; that justice be rigor-
ous in its equality yet "now and then" relax in compassion.
The problems that the painter faces mirror the problems of life; justice
is a complicated ideal. One eye, two eyes, eyes all over. Sitting, standing,
brandishing a sword, weighing, measuring, naked, dressed. Perhaps, in
the words of Momus: "Flatly, the thing can't be done"-not by philoso-
phers, painters, or lawyers.
V. OF SOVEREIGNS AND JUDGES
The imagery of justice reflects the tensions inherent in defining what is
just and what stance judges should take vis-a-vis their sovereigns. A blind-
folded Justice not only may suggest the problematic relationship between
judgment and knowledge but also may raise the possibility of the judge as
an actor apart-and the question is: apart from what? If blindness-even
willful blindness, as Bob reminds us-creates distance or independence,
then from what is Justice distant?
One response is that judges must always remain at some distance from
their employers, sovereigns, because of the intrinsic dependence of judges
upon their employers. Distance may insulate judges from the understand-
able desire to please those from whom they receive their livelihood. The
distance protects not only the judge but also the sovereign, who can claim
152. B. FIERA, supra note 143, at 41. The Latin phrase in the original is "nisifortassis olim pro
lusticia Mortem." Id. at 25. An alternative translation would substitute the words "for" or "in place
of" for the words "instead of."
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that the judgments issued are the legitimate product of an independent
voice.
The blindfold is not the only indication in justice imagery of the com-
plex relationship between judge and sovereign. The scales have relevance
here as well; the scales may suggest that an objective standard, indepen-
dent of the whim of any ruler (as well as of the judge), governs the out-
come. The king's thumb is poised to tip the scales, but Justice's firm grip
provides some security. Similarly, the sword might be understood as giv-
ing Justice an independent base of power, a strength beyond that given to
her by her sovereign-employer.153 And since judges were rarely if ever
women, the use of a female figure suggests a justice removed from
actuality.
The complexity of the relationship between judge and sovereign was
central to Bob's work. In Violence and the Word and in the Procedure
casebook,154 Bob told a third "Folktale of Justice"-that of the trial of
Hans Tiede and Ingrid Ruske, both accused of hijacking a plane from
Eastern Europe to West Germany.155 At the time of the hijacking, the
Western Allies had signed an anti-hijacking treaty. The Allies felt obliged
to prosecute Tiede and Ruske, despite the fact that the hijackers had been
greeted warmly upon their arrival in "free Berlin." '56
The United States, as occupier of West Berlin, assumed responsibility
for the trial. The State Department asked Herbert Stern, then a federal
district judge for the District of New Jersey, to sit as the first judge in the
"United States District Court for the District of Berlin" and to preside at
the trial. Upon his arrival in West Berlin, Judge Stern learned that the
State Department held the view that the Executive branch, rather than
the United States Constitution, was the final authority on the rights to be
accorded the defendants at trial.1 57
What ensued was a conflict between the State Department and Judge
Stern. Despite the strenuous, and threatening, objections of the State De-
partment, Judge Stern granted the defendants' motion for a jury trial,
153. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairfield 2d ed. 1966):
The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community ....
The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direc-
tion either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
Id. at 227.
154. R. COVER, 0. FIss & J. RESNIK, supra note 1, ch. 6; Violence and the Word, supra note 2.
155. Violence and the Word, supra note 2, at 1619-21. The events are described in detail in H.
STERN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN (1984), and in United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for
Berlin 1979).
156. H. STERN, supra note 155, at 26-28.
157. Id. at 102-06.
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called prospective jurors, and began the trial.1"8 He dismissed the charges
against Ruske on constitutional grounds, and the trial of Tiede proceeded.
The jury convicted Tiede but, in part because the State Department
claimed to be free from constitutional constraints, Judge Stern sentenced
Tiede to time served.1 59
While the hijacking case was nearing completion, a second, civil lawsuit
was filed in the District Court for Berlin. This case arose out of a conflict
between West Germans over the building of a housing project for United
States troops.160 Although the United States was not a party, its permis-
sion was needed for the lawsuit to proceed in the West German courts,
and the United States declined to give its approval. The West German
plaintiffs then filed in the federal court for the District of Columbia; they
claimed that the United States was depriving them of a right of access to
the courts. After losing at the trial level, the West Germans brought their
complaint to Judge Sternm 1 Once again, the State Department instructed
Judge Stern on how to decide the case. In contrast to the position Stern
took on the hijacking case, Stern declined to issue a ruling on the housing
case; rather, he adjourned his court. 6 2 His actions prompted the State
Department to fire him 6' and to terminate the session of the United
States Court for Berlin.
One interesting aspect of this conflict is why the State Department
chose a sitting federal judge, instead of one of its employees or a member
of the military, to preside at the first trial held in the United States Court
for the District of Berlin. The State Department might have thought that
Stern, a former federal prosecutor, would have been sympathetic to the
Department's views, but once the Department found him difficult to con-
trol, why keep him on? This conflict reveals a good deal about the rela-
tionship between sovereign and judge. The State Department held a
highly visible trial and sought the legitimacy of a person already garbed in
judicial robes. When the judge took the robes seriously and claimed his
allegiance to a law independent of the State Department, the sovereign
was unhappy. Yet, given the nature of the conflict-a politically signifi-
cant criminal trial held as the world watched-the sovereign dared not
fire its judge. On the other hand, when sovereign and judge battled over a
more mundane civil lawsuit, the sovereign was less restrained.
Sovereigns need judges. Sovereigns would like judges to do their bidding
but rely upon judges to appear independent. The deployment of justice
158. United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 261 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979).
159. H. STERN, supra note 155, at 370.
160. Id. at 340.
161. See Dostal v. Haig, 652 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1981); H. STERN, supra note 155, at 340-42.
162. H. STERN, supra note 155, at 353-73.
163. Id. at 374.
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imagery-of a regally-robed, coolly impersonal, blindfolded woman hold-
ing sword and scales-bespeaks the effort by sovereigns to make us accept
the judgments of their judicial employees.""
But judges also need sovereigns. When taking his stance in the criminal
hijacking case, Judge Stern reflected on his own security as he fought with
his sovereign. He understood that, in his other role as United States Dis-
trict Judge for the District of New Jersey, he sat as an Article III judge,
safe from the fear of being fired. Stern wondered whether he would have
been so willing to battle, had he not had his other, protected, judicial
role.165 Further, to make his grand gesture-to insist upon a jury trial
and then to refuse to sentence the hijacker to any further time in the
custody of a sovereign who declined to recognize that it was constrained
by the Constitution 16 -Judge Stern needed recognition as a judge to
wield the power given him by the sovereign. He needed power to carry
out the heroic tasks of disagreeing with and defying his sovereign.
Bob's tale of Justitia with a blindfold raises the interesting question:
Who placed the blindfold on Justice? Bob created a mythic heroine, the
powerful judge, who deliberately distances herself from the fray. Bob's
article, the Folktales ofJustice, made plain his appreciation for the power
of the gesture he invented, for he knew it would have been plausible to
imagine the gods placing the blindfold on the one they chose as their
judge. When Bob wrote of alternative versions of the conflicts between
judges and kings, he contrasted the heroic mythic versions (in which
judges stood up in the face of power to speak their truths) with claims of
historical truths (in which, at least according to some accounts, judges
were not brave but begged their kings to preserve their judicial offices and
even their lives).1617 As Bob wrote: "History corrects for the scale of her-
oics that we would otherwise project upon the past. Only myth tells us
who we would become; only history can tell us how hard it will really be
to become that.'""8
The reality of the judicial role may mean that the attributes of jus-
tice-the blindfold, scales, and sword-have importance for both the judge
164. Cf Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (approving action of ad hoc military tribunal ap-
pointed by President to try alleged German saboteurs who landed in United States). See generally R.
COVER, 0. Fiss & J. RESNIK, supra note 1, ch. 6.
165. H. STERN, supra note 155, at 370-73. Not all judges in the United States have such a
luxury. See generally Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581
(1985). In California, the recent retention election resulted in the defeat of three justices. See, e.g.,
Endicott, Bird Lovers, Haters Get Set for '86, L.A. Times, Jan. 27, 1985, § IV, at 1, col. 1; Ingram,
Prosecutors' Association Urges Defeat of Justice Bird, L.A. Times, Mar. 1, 1985, § I, at 3, col. 6;
Lindsey, Deukmejian and Cranston Win as 3Judges Are Ousted, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1986, at A30,
col. 1.
166. H. STERN, supra note 155, at 370.
167. Folktales of Justice, supra note 2, at 184-90.
168. Id. at 190.
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and the sovereign. Both may choose the same symbols but draw different
meaning from them. We might imagine that the heroic judge imposes her
own blindfold, and we also might imagine that the sovereign imposes the
blindfold. The blindfold need not only indicate a judge removed, deliber-
ately self-constrained, but also a judge dependent upon a sovereign and
yet needing to be walled off from that sovereign-in order for the sover-
eign to claim the validity of the justice rendered. Similarly, scales and
sword may enable the judge to claim a law independent of the sovereign,
but may also enable the sovereign to assure its subjects that the indepen-
dently powerful judges are making objective decisions.
VI. IMAGES OF THE FUTURE
In the United States, divisions of power have lessened the absolute au-
thority of the sovereign and strengthened the independence of the judici-
ary. Federal judges have structural protections, guaranteeing them salaries
and jobs, even when they defy the will of the executive."' 9 With such
institutional arrangements, do we need anything else to legitimate judicial
decisionmaking? Folktales of justice, which Bob taught us? Images of
justice?
It is not only institutional arrangements that have been altered since
medieval and Renaissance times; allegory is not as popular as it used to
be. Perhaps the advent of public education, the printing press, the photo-
graph and television have decreased the need or the market for paintings
and statues of the didactic, allegorical kind. Perhaps the art of Justice
became so abstract that it ceased to instruct.17 0 Perhaps the explosion in
the sheer number of images that now crowd our consciousness has made it
impossible for any set of representations to achieve enduring national rec-
ognition. For some, John Wayne is iconic,' 7' but for others his image is
already faded and diffused by warriors of more recent vintage. Abstraction
has shown us what kind of painting and sculpture can be created when
the need for representation is fulfilled by other media. 1 2
One might be tempted to claim that iconography is dead, but just as
post-modern art tells us that representation remains relevant, current po-
169. See Resnik, supra note 165, at 589 (current Supreme Court interpretation of Article III
comports with view of judiciary needing protection to do combat with executive).
170. E. GOMBRICH, supra note 70, at 183 (in the eighteenth century, "[airtists began to think
that the more generalized was the concept they had to symbolize the paler and more etiolated should
be the image. . . . [But the images] acquired the faculty of making themselves as invisible as the
abstractions they were supposed to symbolize.").
171. See, e.g., Jules Feiffer, Cartoon, L.A. Times, Dec. 21, 1986, Calendar section, at 60 (Ronald
Reagan consulting with his "maker," the "Duke").
172. See generally R. HUGHES, THE SHOCK OF THE NEW (1980); R. KRAUSS, THE ORIGINAL-
ITY OF THE AVANT-GARDE AND OTHER MODERNIST MYTHS (1985).
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litical events indicate that sovereigns continue to have use for the deploy-
ment of images. We have recently witnessed wholesale governmental ex-
ploitation of iconography. During 1986, the Statue of Liberty permeated
our consciousness.17 3 She was everywhere. The celebration of the statue's
hundredth anniversary culminated in a binge of patriotic expression and
media attention. In 1986, as in the sixteenth century, a government tried
to send forth a message, this time linking its rule to liberty. As in times of
old, the image presented was of an imposing female form, this time with
an odd spiked headpiece and a torch." 4
The timing of governmental efforts to market the Statue of Liberty had
unintended effects. There was powerful irony in watching the celebration
of "Lady Liberty" within weeks of the conviction of church members who
had attempted to help refugees find sanctuary in this country.'7 5 Just as
our generation is rarely shown images of "Maimed Justice," we learn
little of the detention centers run by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service-jails for those "huddled masses, yearning to be free," celebrated
in the poetry of Emma Lazarus.1 6 In her idealized form, the Statue of
Liberty worked to soothe our concerns, to proclaim a national commit-
ment that the government's behavior often belies.
As Justice was not the only medieval and Renaissance image, the
Statue of Liberty is not the only national symbol. Federal statutes protect
the flag, the "Great Seal," and even "Smokey Bear" and "Woodsy
Owl.'" T The Supreme Court has recently told us that the Constitution
permits municipalities to display the "Nativity scene" as long as it serves
the "secular purpose" of using the imagery to "celebrate the Holiday and
to depict the origins of that Holiday."' 78 According to the majority, "[t]he
display engenders a friendly community spirit of goodwill in keeping with
the season."'7 9 Unintimidated by the nuances and ambiguities of semio-
173. See Hall, Liberty Lifts Her Lamp Once More, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, July 1986, at 2; Presi-
dent's Remarks on Signing H.J. Res. 407 and Proclamation 5400, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
1308 (Oct. 28, 1985) (Centennial Year of Liberty in United States); 22 id. at 191 (Feb. 6, 1986)
(President receiving gifts of replicas of statue); President's Radio Address to the Nation, id. at 913
(July 5, 1986) (Independence Day and Centennial of Statue of Liberty).
174. See M. WARNER, supra note 4, at 8-9.
175. United States v. Aquilar, appeal docketed, No. 86-1211 (9th Cir. 1986). The United States
Government prosecuted eleven religously-affiliated workers. In the spring of 1986, eight were con-
victed; sentencing took place July 1-2, 1986. All received terms of probation. See Curry, INS To
Study Claims of Abuse as Sanctuary Sentencing Ends, L.A. Times, July 3, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
176. E. Lazarus, The New Colussus (1883) (unpublished manuscript available at American Jew-
ish Historical Society, Waltham, Massachusetts).
177. 18 U.S.C. §§ 711, 711a, 713 (1982). In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, "Co-
lumbia" was used as a symbol of the United States, and "Uncle Sam" continues to function in a
similar manner. See C. PREss, THE POLITICAL CARTOON 213-31 (1981).
178. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984) (capitalizations of "Holiday" and "Nativity"
in the original).
179. Id. at 685.
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tics, the Supreme Court is prepared to stipulate a positive symbolic mean-
ing and to authorize government deployment of pictorial and sculptured
images.180
Where does Justice fit in all this? Although no federal statute recog-
nizes or protects her, she is still found on courthouses and public build-
ings-including some constructed in the twentieth century.8 1  However,
she may be drained of content, reduced to little more than a logo. Al-
though the flag salute says "with liberty and justice for all," the two con-
cepts, together with their images, may have become indistinct. Justice's
image has already begun to blur with that of Liberty. Over the last few
decades, the Statue of Liberty has occasionally appeared with a blindfold
or scales.812
Why might Liberty now assume a place more prominent than that of
Justice? Perhaps because Justice is stateless. Many of the continental Eu-
ropean countries, Great Britain, and the United States use her image but
she is synonymous with none. In contrast, despite her French origin, the
Statue of Liberty has become strongly identified with the United States. 83
Perhaps because Justice is a complex concept-remember that Ambrogio
needed to paint her twice and label her three times, as Distributive Jus-
tice, Commutative Justice, and Vindictive Justice.8 4 Perhaps because at
some level of generality, the concept of liberty is simpler than that of jus-
tice. Or, perhaps because liberty is an idea with more surface appeal to-
day than justice.' 85 Perhaps, in a world of compromise and relativity, a
180. All of those Justices who wrote opinions were prepared to stipulate to the meanings of the
cr&he. For the majority opinion, written by then Chief Justice Burger, the cr&he was a "passive"
symbol. Id. For Justice O'Connor, concurring, "[t]he evident purpose of including the criche in the
larger display was not promotion of the religious content of the creche but celebration of the public
holiday through its traditional symbols." Id. at 691. Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, explained that "[tihe essence of the cr&che's symbolic purpose and
effect is to prompt the observer to experience a sense of simple awe and wonder appropriate to the
contemplation of one of the central elements of Christian dogma-that God sent His Son into the
world to be a Messiah." Id. at 711 (citations omitted). For Justice Blackmun, who wrote a separate
dissent, the majority's approval of the display of the creche would "encourage use of the creche in a
municipally sponsored display, a setting where Christians feel constrained in acknowledging its sym-
bolic meaning and non-Christians feel alienated by its presence." Id. at 727. This represented, for
Justice Blackmun, a misuse of a "sacred symbol." Id. For one critique, see Dorsen & Sims, The
Nativity Scene Case: An Error of Judgment, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 837.
181. See, e.g., TIME, July 21, 1986, at 13 (photograph of Att'y Gen. Meese announcing his anti-
pornography campaign at Department of Justice before statue of nearly-nude woman).
182. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 1971 (cover picture of Statue of Liberty holding scales of
justice).
183. See, e.g., S. HOFF, EDITORIAL AND PoLrrICAL CARTOONING 359 (1976) (reprint of cartoon
appearing in Le Canard Enchaini, in France, of Statue of Liberty wearing gas mask and inscription
"Of course, in France they do know America has pollution. But doesn't everybody?").
184. See supra text accompanying notes 46-52.
185. Exactly how much appeal depends upon whose liberty is at stake. Compare the enactment
by Congress of preventive detention provisions based upon the dangerousness of an indicted defendant,
The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (Supp. 11 1984); see also United States v.
Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of preventive detention against facial
1770
Vol. 96: 1727, 1987
Images of Justice
Justice with sword, scales, and blindfold can no longer be emblematic of
the application of law.18
To understand the complexities of the exercise by a sovereign either of
its justice or of its dedication to liberty, we must attend carefully. We
must see the quotas, the deportations, the detention centers of the INS as
well as the welcoming flame of our "Lady of Liberty." We must ask
whose liberty is protected. We view it as a loss that we know little about
the images of "Maimed Justice"-that, absent education, we could not
recognize the skin of Sisamnes when we stumbled across a print of the
story of Cambyses; that the Klimt version of Jurisprudence was rejected
as too controversial to grace a University's halls; that in the 1930's, a
mural of a non-classical Justice was similarly rejected in the United
States;187 that the blindfold is commonly understood as a positive attribute
rather than as a profound limitation. While imagery of justice may be less
important to the state than in the past, the images have a powerful evoca-
tive potential worth preserving.
The idea of justice exists not only on the pages of books, but also, on a
deeper level, in present day psyches. Heroic images and mythmaking
touch upon our understanding of this abstract concept in a manner differ-
ent than do expository texts. While the forms may change, efforts continue
to create a world better than the one we inhabit today. 8 Sovereigns con-
tinue to need judges to authorize and to organize the imposition of vio-
lence," 9 and judges, litigants, and spectators continue to need to imagine
judgment free from bias and from political motivation. Society's depen-
dence upon images and myths thus continues, and the example of the cele-
bration of the Statue of Liberty shows that governments will continue to
exploit their icons.
The imagery, like Bob's folktales, can help show us that justice has a
mythic power that the state hopes to use. At the same time, judges strug-
gle to liberate that power from their sovereigns' grasp. To be effective, the
challenge).
186. See Daube, supra note 32, at 128-29. Further, as Bob reminded us, a single judge, even a
"Herculean" one, is not an accurate image. Not only do judges often work in concert rather than
alone, but the implementation of judicial decisions also depends on other actors. See Violence and the
Word, supra note 2, at 1625.
187. K. MARLING, WALL-TO-WALL AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF POST OFFICE
MURALS IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION 64-71 (1982) (description of controversy engendered by mural
of Justice as Protector and Avenger in courthouse in Aiken, South Carolina in 1938: Justice is pic-
tured, according to newspaper quotation of an unhappy spectator, as a "mulatto").
188. This is reflected in the recent growth of interest in communitarian approaches, "civic vir-
tues," and "Republicanism." Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986).
189. As Bob wrote in Violence and the Word, supra note 2, at 1628, the imposition of violence by
sovereigns who do not rely upon the organization implicit in the judiciary is more frightening than
judicially-based violence.
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myths and the images must remain vital and immediate. We fear that,
should Justice simply be a courthouse logo, a marker drained of mythic
meaning, our attentiveness to the problematic relationships between judg-
ment and knowledge and between sovereign and judge might fade. When
we lose the ambiguities and the grotesqueries in the images of Justice,
when we lose either the history or the mythic versions of the folktales, we
may be lulled into misunderstanding both justice's power and its limits.
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